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RICHARD SQUIRE
The Case for Symmetry in Creditors' Rights
A B S T R A C T. Using an original framework for evaluating bankruptcy rules, this Article casts
doubt on the efficiency of legal arrangements that give some creditors an absolute advantage
over others in the division of a debtor's assets. Such arrangements, which I classify as
asymmetrical, are widely used in the modem economy, and include the secured loan, American
general partnership, and guaranty contract. In contrast, symmetrical arrangements, which include
the corporation and common law partnership, confer no absolute advantage, because they give
each creditor group a prior claim to a distinct debtor asset pool. I demonstrate that symmetrical
arrangements produce lower debt appraisal costs, more efficient creditor monitoring, and
speedier bankruptcy proceedings; they also are less conducive to exploitation of creditors such as
tort victims who do not adjust to subordination of their claims. These results indicate that
lawmakers could create social wealth by reforming asymmetrical arrangements to be
symmetrical. The Article concludes by showing how symmetry is superior to previous proposals
for reforming the secured loan.
A U T H 0 R. Associate Professor, Fordham University School of Law. For helpful comments on
earlier drafts, I am grateful to Halia M. Barnes, Margaret Blair, Susan Block-Lieb, Chris
Brummer, Elizabeth F. Emens, Jill E. Fisch, Jesse M. Fried, Caroline Gentile, Jeffrey N. Gordon,
Henry Hansmann, Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Marcel Kahan, Reinier Kraakman, Thomas H. Lee,
Brett McDonnell, Edward R. Morrison, Robert K. Rasmussen, Larry Ribstein, Daniel C.
Richman, Rebecca Roiphe, Max M. Schanzenbach, Peter H. Schuck, Josh Singer, Linda Sugin,
Steve Thel, and Benjamin Zipursky.
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INTRODUCTION
The foundation of modern bankruptcy systems is the pro rata rule, which
pays all creditors an equal percentage on their claims. But debtors can, and
often do, override the pro rata rule through asset partitioning, which is the
nonconsensual subordination of creditor claims to particular debtor assets.1
Legal arrangements that partition assets are both varied and ubiquitous,
ranging from the corporation and partnership to the secured loan.
Because partitioning arrangements forcefully subordinate creditor claims,
they transfer wealth away from claimants such as tort victims who do not
adjust when their claims are impaired.2 Despite the social costs of these wealth
transfers, previous scholarship has argued that partitioning arrangements can
create value by providing various economic efficiencies.3 In weighing costs and
benefits, however, this literature has taken little account of key differences in
the ways that partitioning arrangements prioritize creditor claims.4
This Article provides an original framework for comparing the efficiency of
different partitioning arrangements. I identify a universal distinction between
two basic types of asset partitioning, which I term symmetry and asymmetry.
Despite their variety, all partitioning arrangements can be categorized as either
symmetrical or asymmetrical. Symmetrical arrangements divide creditors into
groups and give each group a prior claim to a distinct asset pool in the debtor's
estate.5 In contrast, asymmetrical arrangements give prior claims to some
1. Henry Hansmann, Reinier Kraakman & Richard Squire, Law and the Rise of the Firm, 119
HARv. L. REV. 1333, 1343-48 (2006).
2. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy Case for the Priority of Secured Claims
in Bankruptcy, 1O5 YALE L.J. 857, 898-902 (1996); Hansmann et al., supra note 1, at 1351.
3. See, e.g., Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The Essential Role of Organizational Law,
11o YALE L.J. 387, 398-405, 423-27 (2000) (describing the economic benefits of various rules
of asset partitioning).
4. For example, the corporation divides a business owner's creditors into two groups and gives
each group the first claim to a distinct asset pool. In contrast, the secured loan gives one
creditor a prior claim to one asset pool but confers no similar advantage on the debtor's
remaining creditors. Yet previous scholarship contends that both arrangements make it
easier for creditors to appraise and monitor debtors, and does not consider whether one
structure provides these benefits more than the other. See Thomas H. Jackson & Anthony T.
Kronman, Secured Financing and Priorities Among Creditors, 88 YALE L.J. 1143, 1149 (1979)
(discussing the secured loan); Richard A. Posner, The Rights of Creditors of Affiliated
Corporations, 43 U. CHI. L. REv. 499, 508-09 (1975) (discussing the corporation).
s. Under current law, the corporation, common law partnership, limited liability company,
and Delaware business trust are symmetrical. See infra note 14 and accompanying text.
118:806 2009
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creditors but not others, advantaging select creditors by according them both a
prior claim to one asset pool and a pro rata claim to remaining debtor assets.6
The distinction between symmetry and asymmetry is powerful because, as
Part I of this Article demonstrates, symmetry is superior to asymmetry with
respect to each of the major economic benefits of asset partitioning that
scholars have identified. In particular, symmetry does more than asymmetry to
tie each creditor's fortunes to a discrete asset pool, thereby permitting creditors
to economize on the costs they incur when appraising risk. Symmetry also
encourages efficient monitoring of debtors by allowing creditors who rescue
assets from debtor misconduct to keep more of those assets for themselves.
Asymmetry, by contrast, undermines monitoring incentives, because it
insulates some creditors from the losses they could most cheaply prevent.
Finally, symmetry does more than asymmetry to expedite the distribution of
assets to creditors in a bankruptcy proceeding.
If asymmetrical arrangements are categorically inefficient, why are they so
common? The answer, I argue, is opportunism. It is easier to use asymmetry
than symmetry to transfer wealth away from nonadjusting creditors. And the
use of asymmetry to transfer wealth is a drag on the economy: not only does it
forgo the social benefits of symmetry, but by distorting interest rates it
encourages wasteful investment decisions.
These findings reveal that lawmakers could create social wealth by
reforming asymmetrical arrangements to be symmetrical. Part II considers in
depth the opportunity for reform of the secured loan, which is asymmetrical
under current law. Because of its central role in modern commerce, 7 the
secured loan has been the subject of numerous reform proposals. I show that
all of these proposals seek to reduce opportunism costs in a manner that would
undermine the economic benefits that secured loans now provide. Symmetry,
by contrast, would curtail opportunism while simultaneously enhancing rather
than undermining the secured loan's economic benefits. In short, symmetry is
the only reform proposal for the secured loan with no apparent economic
downside.
More broadly, this Article's framework reveals opportunities for reform of
other widely used asymmetrical arrangements. As I show next, the benefits of
6. Under, current law, the secured loan, American general partnership, and guaranty contract
are asymmetrical. See infra note 15 and accompanying text.
7. See Elizabeth Warren & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Contracting Out of Bankruptcy: An
Empirical Intervention, 118 HARv. L. REv. 1197, 1222 (2005) (finding that more than 6o% of
the liabilities of bankrupt commercial debtors are owed to secured creditors).
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reform can be understood through a simple model that demonstrates the
efficiency of symmetry in the allocation of creditors' rights.
I. THE ECONOMICS OF SYMMETRY AND ASYMMETRY IN ASSET
PARTITIONING
This Part begins by presenting a simple model of a lending arrangement
that illustrates the difference between symmetry and asymmetry. I then use the
model to evaluate symmetry and asymmetry in terms of each of the important
social benefits and costs of asset partitioning.
A. A Simple Model of Asset Partitioning
The simple model has three parties: Debtor, and two creditors -Creditor 1
and Creditor 2-who have claims against Debtor.8 Debtor owns two asset
pools-Asset 1 and Asset 2.9 Three versions of the model can be imagined,
reflecting in turn the pro rata rule, symmetry, and asymmetry.1"
The pro rata rule, which is the modern bankruptcy default rule in the
absence of asset partitioning," pays all creditors an equal percentage on their
claims. Thus, in the pro rata version of the simple model, if Debtor owes
Creditor 1 and Creditor 2 $1oo each, and defaults when Asset 1 is worth $50
and Asset 2 is worth $90, then each creditor recovers $70, or 5o% of Debtor's
overall estate.
Symmetry departs from the pro rata rule by dividing creditors into groups
and giving each group a prior claim to a distinct debtor asset pool. Thus, in the
symmetrical version of the model, Creditor 1 has a prior claim to Asset 1, and
Creditor 2 has a prior claim to Asset 2. If once again each creditor is owed $ioo
8. To help distinguish among the parties, I will refer to Creditor 1 as a "he," Creditor 2 as a
"she" and Debtor as an "it."
9. Debtor also has a claim to the asset pools, but it is an equity claim and therefore is
subordinate to the creditors' claims.
1o. One might imagine a fourth version, in which Creditor 1 has a prior claim to both asset
pools. Such a configuration could result, for example, from a subordination agreement
between the creditors. I do not analyze this possibility here because strictly speaking it is not
an example of a partitioning arrangement: there is no practical distinction between the asset
pools, and-when there is a subordination agreement-the impairment of Creditor 2's claim
is consensual. A nonconsensual analog to this structure exists, however, in the form of the
"blanket lien," which is a secured claim to a debtor's entire estate. I address the blanket lien
in my discussion of secured lending in Subsection II.F.2, infra.
11. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 726(b) (2000) (providing for pro rata payment of unsecured claims).
118:8o6 2009
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and Debtor defaults when Asset 1 is worth $50 and Asset 2 is worth $90, then
under symmetry Creditor 1 recovers $5o and Creditor 2 recovers $9o. As this
example illustrates, it is possible under symmetry for either creditor to recover
a higher percentage on his or her claim than the other does, depending on the
relative values of the asset pools in bankruptcy.
An additional feature of symmetrical arrangements is that they give at least
some creditors a "deficiency claim," which is a right to levy on the debtor's
remaining assets to the extent of any shortfall in the creditor's designated asset
pool. Deficiency claims in symmetrical arrangements are always subordinated.
This means that, in the symmetrical version of the simple model, Creditor 2
can levy on Asset 1 if there is a shortfall in Asset 2, but only if Creditor 1 is first
paid in full. Conversely, Creditor 1 can collect from Asset 2 if there is a shortfall
in Asset 1, but only if Creditor 2 is first paid in full. Another possibility under
symmetry is that the debtor enjoys limited liability, and therefore that some
creditors lack a deficiency claim altogether. In the model, this would mean that
Creditor 2 has a deficiency claim but Creditor i does not. When I discuss the
symmetrical version of the simple model in this Article, I generally assume that
both creditors have deficiency claims, but I comment on the implications of the
limited liability alternative where relevant.
Finally, asymmetry also divides creditors into groups, but unlike symmetry
it gives only one group a prior claim to a distinct asset pool. Thus, in the
asymmetrical version of the model, Creditor i has a prior claim to Asset 1, and
he also has a deficiency claim to Asset 2 that is paid pro rata with Creditor 2's
claim. This structure ensures Creditor 1 that he will always recover a higher
percentage on his claim than Creditor 2 does if Debtor falls bankrupt (unless
Asset 1 drops in value to nothing, in which case the two creditors recover pro
rata). As an illustration, assume once more that each creditor is owed $ioo and
Debtor defaults when Asset 1 is worth $5o and Asset 2 is worth $90. Under
asymmetry, Creditor 1 recovers the full $5o in Asset 1, and he then asserts a $5o
deficiency claim against Asset 2. Because Creditor i's deficiency claim is half the
size of Creditor 2's $1oo claim, his share of Asset 2 is half as big as hers:
Creditor 1 gets $30, bringing his total recovery to $80, and Creditor 2 gets the
remaining $60.12 I also will assume in the asymmetrical version of the model
12. This method of computing creditor recoveries under asymmetry reflects the common law
rule of marshaling and is expressly required by the Bankruptcy Code for the secured loan. ii
U.S.C. § 5o6(a); see also William H. Widen, Corporate Form and Substantive Consolidation, 75
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 237, 303-04 (2007) (describing the marshaling rule). Under an
alternative approach, which one might call the "anti-marshaling" rule, Creditor i's pro rata
recovery from Asset 2 remains capped at the deficiency in Asset i, but subject to that cap is
calculated using the amount of his original claim rather than the deficiency. Applying this
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that Creditor 2 has a deficiency claim to Asset 1, but it is subordinated to
Creditor i's claim.'
3
Despite their variety, all asset partitioning arrangements can be
characterized as either symmetrical or asymmetrical. The symmetrical version
of the model illustrates creditor priorities in the common law's "jingle-rule"
partnership, as well as in limited liability entities such as the corporation,
limited liability company (LLC), limited liability partnership (LLP), and
Delaware business trust. In each of these commercial arrangements, the firm's
creditors have a prior claim to the firm's assets, and the personal creditors of
each owner have either a prior (under the jingle rule) or exclusive (under
limited liability) claim to that owner's personal assets.' 4 The asymmetrical
version of the model, in turn, represents the general partnership as modified by
statute in the United States, where partnership creditors enjoy both a prior
claim to partnership assets and, to the extent of any deficiency in those assets, a
claim to personal assets paid pro rata with the claims of personal creditors.'"
rule to my numerical example causes Creditor 1 to recover (in addition to the full value in
Asset 1) half the value of Asset 2, due to the fact that his original claim of $1oo is equal to
Creditor 2'S claim. Thus, Creditor l's total recovery becomes $95, and Creditor 2's becomes
$45. As this example illustrates, the anti-marshaling rule results in a more extreme form of
asymmetry, as it further increases Creditor i's percentage recovery relative to Creditor 2's
(unless Asset 1 drops to nothing, in which case the two again recover pro rata). Although the
anti-marshaling rule contradicts the common law principle that a creditor may not "double
prove" the same claim, Widen, supra, at 304, it is expressly required by the Bankruptcy Code
for calculating a partnership creditor's recovery when both the partnership and an
individual partner are bankrupt. See infra note 15.
13. The disadvantaged creditors in asymmetrical arrangements usually enjoy subordinated
deficiency claims. For example, unsecured creditors can levy on any surplus in the secured
assets, and personal creditors of partners in an American general partnership may seize the
partners' equity interest in the partnership assets. But not all asymmetrical arrangements
follow this pattern. See infra note 20.
14. See Hansmann et al., supra note i, at 1397 (describing modem commercial entities as
combining "entity shielding," whereby firm creditors enjoy the first claim to firm assets, and
limited liability); see also Exparte Crowder, (1715) 23 Eng. Rep. 1064 (Ch.) (establishing the
"jingle rule" for partnership bankruptcies, so named because its symmetry makes it easy to
remember); UNIF. P'SHIP AcT 5 4o(h), 6 U.L.A. 902 (1914) (codifying the jingle rule in the
United States).
is. See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 723(c), 92 Stat. 2606 (codified as
amended at 11 U.S.C. § 723(c)) (overriding the jingle rule to provide for payment of
partnership creditor deficiency claims on parity with claims of personal creditors); UNIF.
P'SHIp ACT § 807(a) (amended 1997), 6 U.L.A. 206 (2001) (same). In addition to rejecting
the jingle rule, Congress also ignored the common law's preference for marshaling, instead
providing that a partnership creditor may "double prove" the full amount of his claim
against the estates of both a bankrupt partnership and a bankrupt individual partner, with
the qualification that the recovery from the partner's estate cannot exceed the deficiency in
118:8 o6 2009
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And it represents the secured loan, which gives the secured creditor a prior
claim to the secured assets plus a deficiency claim to the unsecured assets that
is paid pro rata with the claims of the unsecured creditors."
In most cases, a partitioning arrangement's symmetry or asymmetry is the
product of a default rule. Thus, parties often use contract law to switch an
arrangement from one configuration to the other. For example, owners of
closely held corporations often issue personal guaranties on the firm's debt,1 7
and managers of corporate groups frequently cause one company in the group
to guaranty the debt of another."' In both cases, the guaranty makes an
otherwise symmetrical arrangement (the corporation) asymmetrical: the
corporate creditor who receives the guaranty enjoys both a prior claim to the
corporate assets and a deficiency claim against the guarantor that, if the
guarantor is bankrupt, is paid pro rata with the claims of the guarantor's other
creditors.19 In this way, the guaranty contract can be characterized as another
asymmetrical arrangement.2" Conversely, parties sometimes create
"nonrecourse" secured loans in which the secured creditor waives his deficiency
the partnership estate. 11 U.S.C. § 723(c)-(d). For a numerical example using this anti-
marshaling rule, see supra note 12.
16. 11 U.S.C. §§ 5o6(a)(1), 726(a)-(b).
17. See Marshall E. Tracht, Insider Guaranties in Bankruptcy: A Framework for Analysis, 54 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 497, 517 (2000) (observing that approximately half of small business loans
are personally guarantied).
is. See Phillip I. Blumberg, Intragroup (Upstream, Cross-Stream, and Downstream) Guaranties
Under the Uniform Fraudulent TransferAct, 9 CARDozo L. REv. 685, 686-87 (1987).
19. A guaranty on a loan gives the lender the option upon the borrower's default to proceed
against the borrower, the guarantor, or both. At the same time, the equitable right of
contribution enables the guarantor to assert a claim against the borrower for any amount
paid on the guaranty. See Avery Wiener Katz, An Economic Analysis of the Guaranty Contract,
66 U. CHI. L. REv. 47, 6o (1999). The lender's claim against the guarantor is therefore the
economic equivalent of a deficiency claim, as its net impact on the guarantor is capped at the
amount of the deficiency in the borrower's estate. If the guarantor is insolvent when the
lender asserts his claim on the guaranty, the rule favored by the common law (and reflected
in the doctrine of marshaling) computes the lender's pro rata recovery from the guarantor
based on the deficiency in the borrower's estate. See, e.g., In re Wilson, 9 B.R. 723, 726
(Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1981) (reducing a claim against a guarantor by amounts paid by the
primary obligor).
2o. A cross-guaranty within a corporate group is a type of asymmetrical arrangement where the
creditors in the position of Creditor 2 lack a deficiency claim to Asset 1. Those creditors are
the guarantor's other creditors, who lack a claim against the borrower (unless the guarantor
owns the borrower).
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claim, thereby converting an otherwise asymmetrical arrangement into a
symmetrical one.2'
Given that symmetrical and asymmetrical arrangements are both so
common, one might expect that symmetry and asymmetry generate different
economic efficiencies, and that parties choose between them based on
whichever efficiencies will predominate in a particular setting. But direct
analysis using the simple model indicates that this is untrue. As the discussion
that follows demonstrates, symmetry outperforms asymmetry in terms of each
of the major social benefits of asset partitioning that scholars have identified.22
The implication is that, when parties opt for asymmetry, they do so for reasons
other than wealth creation.
B. Asset Partitioning and Appraisal Costs
The economic efficiency that scholars have most frequently attributed to
various partitioning arrangements is the reduction of what I will call appraisal
costs, which are the costs that creditors incur when evaluating a prospective
debtor to decide whether to extend credit and on what terms. Creditors will be
particularly interested in the value of the debtor's assets, as asset values will
determine the creditors' recoveries if the debtor falls bankrupt. 3
The first scholar to discuss appraisal costs was Richard Posner, who argued
that the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil, which abrogates limited
shareholder liability, makes it more expensive for creditors to evaluate lending
risk. 4 Although Posner's argument was (in effect) a defense of the
21. See discussion infra Section II.G.
22. Although I examine the primary benefits of asset partitioning emphasized in the literature,
other potential efficiencies have been noted in specific contexts. For example, Henry
Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman have observed that many commercial entities exhibit
"liquidation protection," meaning that personal creditors of owners cannot force dissolution
of the entity to levy on its assets. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 3, at 394. Liquidation
protection can generate wealth by protecting a firm's going-concern value and permitting
investment diversification and transferable shares. Hansmann et al., supra note 1, at 1348-50.
I do not analyze liquidation protection here because its benefits are unlikely to depend on
whether the commercial entity is symmetrical or asymmetrical.
23. Other important considerations will be the debtor's credit history and amount of current
indebtedness.
24. Posner, supra note 4, at 516-17.
118:806 2009
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corporation's symmetry,2" scholars subsequently have cited appraisal
efficiencies as a benefit of various asymmetrical arrangements, including the
secured loan, 6 guaranty contract, 7 and American general partnership.28
Analysis using the simple model suggests that these extensions of Posner's
original argument should have come with an important caveat. Yes,
asymmetrical arrangements may generate some appraisal benefits relative to
the pro rata rule. But the benefits are smaller than they are under symmetry. In
particular, asymmetry does not tie lending risk to particular asset pools to the
same extent that symmetry does, nor does it enable all creditor groups to
specialize by lending against only a portion of a debtor's estate. Therefore,
appraisal efficiencies alone cannot explain why parties would choose
asymmetry when a symmetrical alternative is available. Nor can they justify a
decision by lawmakers to make an arrangement asymmetrical as a default rule.
To understand the relationship between asset partitioning and appraisal
costs, it is useful to observe that a debtor's insolvency can take different forms,
as the simple model will serve to illustrate. Thus, assume that both of Debtor's
asset pools are initially "above water" - meaning that Asset 1 is worth more
than Creditor i's claim, and Asset 2 is worth more than Creditor 2's claim.
Assume further that there is some risk that the pools will drop in value, which
in turn may cause Debtor to fall insolvent and default before it repays its debts.
It follows that Debtor's insolvency could take three different forms. First, Asset
1 might devaluate far enough to render Debtor insolvent even though Asset 2
remains above water. Second, Asset 2 might devaluate far enough to render
Debtor insolvent even though Asset 1 remains above water. And third, both
asset pools might drop underwater. The riskiness of each creditor's lending
position is therefore a product of the probabilities of these three insolvency
outcomes and the amount the creditor recovers in each.
Under the pro rata rule, both creditors recover from both asset pools in all
three insolvency outcomes. Therefore, to get an accurate risk assessment under
the pro rata rule, the creditors must spread their appraisal efforts evenly across
2s. Id. at 517 ("Acquiring the necessary information will become even more complicated if we
allow not only the subsidiary's creditors to reach the assets of the parent, but the parent's
creditors to reach the assets of the subsidiary .... ").
26. See, e.g., F.H. Buckley, The Bankruptcy Priority Puzzle, 72 VA. L. REV. 1393, 1424-25 (1986).
27. See Katz, supra note 19, at 85.
aS. See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 3, at 427-28; see also Hansmann et al., supra note 1, at
1392-93; Henry Hansmann, Reinier Kraakman & Richard Squire, The New Business Entities
in Evolutionaty Perspective, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 5, 10 (arguing that the American partnership
rule, whereby partnership creditors enjoy first claim to partnership assets, is a source of
informational efficiencies).
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Debtor's estate. The question is whether asset partitioning can permit the
creditors to economize on their appraisal costs by rationally narrowing their
focus.
Consider symmetry first. Regardless of the form of Debtor's insolvency,
Creditor 1 recovers from Asset 1, just as he does under the pro rata rule. But
under symmetry he recovers from Asset 2 only in the insolvency outcome
where Asset 1 alone is underwater, as that is the only outcome where there is
both a deficiency in Asset 1 and a surplus in Asset 2. Moreover, in that outcome
he recovers less from Asset 2 under symmetry than he does under the pro rata
rule, because under symmetry his claim to Asset 2 is subordinated. (And in the
limited liability alternative he recovers nothing from Asset 2, because then his
deficiency claim is eliminated altogether.) Therefore, if Creditor 1 were to
conserve on his appraisal efforts by focusing solely on Asset 1, he would know
more about his overall risk exposure under symmetry than he would under the
pro rata rule.
Because of the nature of symmetry, the same analysis applies in mirror-
image form to Creditor 2. She now recovers from Asset 1 only in the insolvency
outcome where Asset 2 alone is underwater, and she recovers less from it under
symmetry than she does under the pro rata rule. If she were to focus her
appraisal efforts solely on Asset 2, she too would know more about her overall
risk exposure under symmetry than she would under the pro rata rule.
Symmetry will be especially beneficial to both creditors if Debtor's assets
are used for different purposes, thereby permitting the creditors to specialize in
lending against the type of asset they can appraise more cheaply. Consider an
example of a sole proprietor who owns both a grocery store and some personal
assets. Assume that the proprietor has one trade creditor and one personal
creditor. Because of his industry experience, the trade creditor will naturally
find the grocery assets cheaper to valuate. If the proprietor were to form a
corporation and assign to it both the grocery assets and the trade creditor's
claim, the corporation's symmetry would tie the trade creditor's fortunes to the
grocery assets, thereby reducing the trade creditor's appraisal costs. In a
competitive lending market, this benefit would be captured by the proprietor
in the form of a lower interest rate on the trade debt. Incorporation of the
grocery business also would automatically tie the personal creditor's risk
exposure to the personal assets, which the personal creditor also would
probably be able to appraise more cheaply. Similar benefits from specialization
118:8o6 2009
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would arise if, to use a different example, joint owners of two distinct
businesses incorporated them separately, thereby forming a corporate group.2 9
The potential for an asymmetrical arrangement to generate appraisal
efficiencies is much more limited. In the asymmetrical version of the simple
model, Creditor 1 recovers from Asset i in all three insolvency outcomes, just as
he does under symmetry. And because his deficiency claim to Asset 2 is not
subordinated, he recovers from that asset pool not only in the outcome when
Asset 1 alone is underwater, but also when both asset pools are underwater.
Finally, when Asset 1 alone is underwater, he takes a larger portion of Asset 2
under asymmetry than he does under symmetry. Therefore, if Creditor i were
to conserve on his appraisal efforts by focusing solely on Asset 1, he would
know less about his overall risk exposure under asymmetry than he would
under symmetry. He would, however, know more than he would under the
pro rata rule, where as noted he recovers from Asset 2 in all three outcomes.
A potential objection at this point is that nothing forces Creditor 1 to
valuate his deficiency claim; even under asymmetry, he could choose to
appraise only Asset 1 and disregard Asset 2. But it must be remembered that
Creditor 2 will demand a higher interest rate from Debtor under asymmetry to
compensate her for the risk that Creditor i's deficiency claim will cut into her
own recovery. Debtor therefore will insist that Creditor 1 either subordinate his
deficiency claim or pay for it through an interest rate concession. And Creditor
1 cannot know how large a concession to make without some sense of the value
of Asset 2.
Asymmetry is even less beneficial to Creditor 2. Once again, she recovers
directly from Asset 2 in all three insolvency outcomes. And under asymmetry
the value of Asset 1 also affects her recovery in all three outcomes, just as is true
under the pro rata rule. Thus, when Asset 2 alone is underwater, her
(subordinated) deficiency claim causes her to recover from Asset 1 directly. And
in the two insolvency outcomes where Asset 1 is underwater, the value of Asset
1 determines the size of Creditor i's deficiency claim, which under asymmetry
determines her recovery from Asset 2.30 The only difference with the pro rata
29. In theory, symmetry might also allow creditors to pay less attention to the amounts owed
other creditors. For example, the size of Creditor 2's overall claim is less likely to affect
Creditor i's recovery under symmetry than under the pro rata rule. But the process of
appraising a debtor's liabilities may not be subject to efficiencies in the same way that the
appraisal of asset values is. Debt amounts are usually specified contractually, and
therefore - once discovered - not as difficult to valuate as are assets.
3o. This is true regardless of whether the marshaling or anti-marshaling rule is used to compute
Creditor 2's recovery, because in either case Creditor i's recovery from Asset 2 is capped at
the amount of the deficiency in Asset 1. See supra note 12.
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case is that the impact on her of Asset i's value is somewhat smaller because
under asymmetry Creditor 1 is paid out of that pool first. The implication is
that, if Creditor 2 were to conserve on her appraisal efforts by focusing solely
on Asset 2, she would know little more about her overall risk exposure under
asymmetry than she would under the pro rata rule.
The fact that the values of both asset pools affect Creditor 2's recovery
under asymmetry regardless of the form of Debtor's insolvency also hampers
specialization. Consider again the example of the sole proprietor who owns a
grocery store. To create asymmetry, the proprietor could give the trade creditor
a secured claim to the grocery assets. Although this would (partially) tie the
trade creditor's risk exposure to the grocery business, it would not capitalize on
the personal creditor's corresponding advantage in appraising the personal
assets, because her exposure to the risks associated with the grocery business
would be almost as great as it would be under the pro rata rule.
In sum, asymmetry also generates appraisal benefits relative to the pro rata
rule. But the benefits are smaller than under symmetry, because asymmetry
does not create tight links between particular creditors and particular assets,
nor does it permit specialization by all creditors.
C. Asset Partitioning and Creditor Monitoring
Another purported benefit of partitioning arrangements is that they make it
easier for creditors to monitor debtors and thus to prevent wealth-destroying
debtor misconduct. Scholars have claimed monitoring efficiencies as a benefit
of symmetrical arrangements: for example, Larry Ribstein has advocated the
jingle rule for partnership bankruptcies on grounds that it reduces creditor
monitoring costs by allowing "separate groups of creditors to focus on separate
piles of assets."'" As with appraisal efficiencies, however, monitoring
efficiencies are more often touted as an advantage of asymmetrical
arrangements.32 Thus, several scholars have argued that the secured loan
promotes efficient creditor monitoring- although, as Part II discusses, they
disagree about which creditors it encourages to monitor.33 Similarly, Avery Katz
31. Larry E. Ribstein, The Illogic and Limits of Partners' Liability in Bankruptcy, 32 WAKE FoREST
L. REV. 31, 66 (1997).
32. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 28 (arguing contra Ribstein that monitoring efficiencies
also arise under the rule of asymmetry now applied to the American general partnership).
33. See, e.g., Jackson & Kronman, supra note 4, at 1149-50 (arguing that the secured loan
encourages unsecured creditors to monitor); Saul Levmore, Monitors and Freeriders in
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has argued that the guaranty contract is superior to alternative arrangements
when the lender whose claim is guarantied can monitor the borrower more
cheaply than the guarantor's other creditors can.34
Taken as a whole, this scholarly commentary suggests that the difference
between symmetry and asymmetry has little impact on creditor monitoring
incentives. But analysis using the simple model shows that this is inaccurate,
and in fact that only symmetry makes efficient monitoring more likely.
Symmetry has what I will call a focusing effect, meaning that it increases the
degree to which a creditor's recovery is determined by the value of a particular
asset pool. This focusing effect promotes the benefits of specialization, an
observation consistent with Ribstein's defense of the jingle rule. And
symmetry's focusing effect also permits creditors to capture more of the
benefits of their own monitoring efforts, thereby ameliorating a collective
action problem caused by the pro rata rule. Asymmetry, in contrast, provides
neither of these benefits. This is because asymmetry has what I will call an
insulating effect, meaning that it shields creditors from devaluation of the assets
to which the creditors enjoy prior claims. As a result, asymmetry discourages
monitoring by those creditors who could most cheaply prevent a loss. In
addition, asymmetry does little to overcome the collective action problem, and
makes it harder for creditors to determine whether monitoring will be cost-
justified. Asymmetry therefore does not improve monitoring incentives relative
to the pro rata rule -and indeed in many situations may make efficient creditor
monitoring less likely.
Before analyzing creditor monitoring incentives under each version of the
simple model, it will be useful to consider in general terms why creditors
monitor a debtor after they extend credit.
1. Monitoring as a Response to Debtor Misconduct
A debtor and its creditors normally share an interest in preserving the value
of the debtor's estate. But when a debtor's liabilities exceed its assets, further
deterioration in the debtor's estate harms only its creditors, opening a gap
between debtor and creditor interests that the debtor might try to exploit. The
resulting debtor conduct-which from the perspective of creditors is surely
"misconduct" -can be divided into two types. The first, which I will call asset
depletion, is action by a debtor that reduces the value of its assets to its
Commercial and Corporate Settings, 92 YALE L.J. 49, 56 (1982) (arguing instead that the
secured loan encourages the secured creditor to monitor).
34. Katz, supra note 19, at 84 (discussing guaranty contracts).
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creditors. An example is when an insolvent debtor consumes its assets or gives
them away to family members or charity. Another example is when a debtor
engages in "asset substitution," meaning that the debtor converts its assets to a
riskier form.3" Riskier assets are less valuable to creditors because creditors are
owed fixed amounts, and they therefore suffer the deeper downswings more
than they profit from the higher upswings when their collateral becomes more
volatile. The second type of debtor misconduct, which I will call debt dilution,
occurs when a debtor takes on new liabilities that are not offset by a
contribution of recoverable assets to the debtor's estate. An example is when a
debtor incurs liability to a tort victim or to a governmental claimant such as a
tax authority.
36
One way to conceptualize the difference between asset depletion and debt
dilution is to observe that creditors recover based on the ratio between a
debtor's assets and liabilities. Asset depletion harms creditors by reducing the
numerator of this ratio, and debt dilution harms them by increasing the
denominator.
Besides potentially changing the distribution of wealth, debtor misconduct
generates various social costs that destroy wealth. First, asset depletion can
cause assets to be assigned to socially inferior uses, because insolvency gives a
debtor reason to consume or shunt away assets even if the debtor gets less
benefit from doing so than its creditors would get from seizing the assets.
Second, asset substitution in particular can produce "overinvestment," which
occurs when a debtor's ability to shift downside risk onto creditors induces the
debtor to invest in risky projects whose expected social value is negative.3 7
Third, tort law will underdeter wasteful conduct if either asset depletion or
debt dilution prevents tort creditors from recovering the full amounts of their
claims. 3 And fourth, contract creditors who anticipate debtor misconduct will
demand higher interest rates as compensation, thereby producing a
35. Alan Schwartz, Security Interests and Bankruptcy Priorities: A Review of Current Theories, io J.
LEGAL STUD. 1, 11 (1981).
36. Debt dilution can also occur, albeit to a lesser extent, even if a contract creditor contributes
recoverable assets to the debtor's estate that are worth as much as the creditor's claim. This
is because such a loan adds another claim against the debtor's equity interest in its estate,
causing the debtor's assets-to-debt ratio to fall if the debtor is solvent. See Alan Schwartz, A
Theory of Loan Priorities, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 209, 228-34 (1989).
37. See Clifford W. Smith, Jr. & Jerold B. Warner, On Financial Contracting: An Analysis of Bond
Covenants, 7 J. FIN. ECON. 117, 118-19 (1979).
38. See Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 2, at 899. This cost can be seen as a special case of
overinvestment, because an expectation that tort creditors will not recover in full may lead
to excessive investment in hazardous activities.
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deadweight loss by causing debtors to forgo wealth-creating projects that
would be profitable but for the increase in borrowing costs.39
The fact that misconduct risk can create a deadweight loss means that both
debtors and creditors often would be better off if debtors could make credible
promises not to misbehave. But debtors usually cannot do this, because
misconduct typically is not apparent until a debtor has fallen insolvent and
thus is judgment proof. This is why some lenders insist on loan covenants that
require immediate repayment if the debtor fails to maintain specified financial
ratios (a sign of insolvency, when misconduct is most likely) or sells most of its
assets (a sign of asset substitution). 40 But creditors must incur monitoring
costs to enforce loan covenants, which include the costs of scrutinizing the
debtor's activities, possible litigation expenses, and the risk that the disruptive
effect of an enforcement action will induce further misconduct or otherwise
compromise the debtor's ability to pay.
Although monitoring costs are (yet) another social cost of debtor
misconduct, creditor monitoring can nonetheless be wealth creating. Creditors
who are active enough to monitor will impute their expected monitoring costs
into the interest rates they demand, just as they will demand higher interest
rates to offset any losses from debtor misconduct they do not expect
monitoring to prevent. Therefore, as long as each dollar spent on monitoring
prevents enough debtor misconduct to increase expected creditor recoveries by
at least one dollar, the prospect of monitoring will reduce borrowing costs and
hence the deadweight loss caused by misconduct risk. And successful
monitoring will also prevent the direct costs of misconduct, including asset
misallocation, overinvestment, and underdeterrence of tortious conduct.41
This discussion suggests that creditor monitoring can be conceptualized as
a two-step process: first, the creditor assesses the debtor's estate to determine if
loan covenants have been breached; second, the creditor decides whether to act
on any breaches that are detected. The first step can be characterized as a
39. In particular, a debtor will fail to borrow if the increase in its borrowing costs due to
misconduct risk is greater than the expected profits from the project that the loan will fund
plus the utility the debtor expects to derive from misbehaving. Importantly, if the debtor
borrows anyway, its higher borrowing costs will not deter misconduct after the loan is
extended. To the contrary, the higher interest rate-will make misconduct more likely by
increasing the debtor's chance of insolvency.
40. See Buckley, supra note 26, at 1443.
41. Cf. Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Limited Liability and the Corporation, 52 U.
CHI. L. REv. 89, loo (1985) (observing that the corporate rule of limited liability may create
social wealth by shifting the risk of managerial misconduct onto the corporation's creditors,
who may have an advantage over shareholders in monitoring the managers).
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midcourse reappraisal of the debtor's assets, the economics of which are likely
similar to those of pre-loan appraisal efforts. In this way, the analysis of
creditor monitoring builds on the discussion of appraisal costs in the previous
section. But the second step introduces an important new element. Information
that a creditor acquires through appraisal efforts is generally not shared with
other creditors. 42 The same is not true, however, of assets a creditor rescues
from debtor misconduct. This is especially true under the pro rata rule, which
divides rescued assets among all creditors in proportion to the amounts of their
claims. Therefore, when deciding whether to monitor, a creditor must consider
not only the costs it will incur, but also what portion of the benefits it will
capture for itself. In this way, the pro rata rule can discourage creditors from
monitoring at efficient levels. Rules of asset partitioning, in turn, can mitigate
or exacerbate this problem.
2. Monitoring Under the Pro Rata Rule
The simple model can be used to illustrate how the pro rata rule
discourages efficient creditor monitoring. Consider a three-period scenario
with the following assumptions. In period one, Debtor borrows $100 from
each of Creditors i and 2, with the proceeds of the two loans becoming Assets 1
and 2, respectively. In period two, Debtor engages in asset substitution unless
Creditor 1 monitors to prevent it. In period three, Debtor either remains
solvent, in which case it repays both loans in full, or it falls insolvent, in which
case it defaults and its assets are liquidated. Insolvency occurs 25% of the time.
If Debtor engages in asset substitution in period two, the liquidation value of
Asset 1 in period three is $70; otherwise, it is $90. 4" Creditor 1 can prevent
Debtor from misbehaving in period two by engaging in monitoring that would
cost him $3. Assume all parties know each of these parameters. Assume also
that the lending market is competitive, meaning that the interest rates
demanded by the creditors in period one reflect any monitoring costs the
creditors expect to incur plus any losses from misconduct they do not expect
monitoring to prevent.
On these assumptions, Debtor's borrowing costs will depend on whether
Creditor 1 intends to monitor. If he does, he will demand $3 more in interest
42. The benefits of appraisal efforts may not be fully internalized, however, because the mere
fact (if discovered) that one creditor is willing to lend at a particular interest rate constitutes
information to others about the debtor's creditworthiness.
43. No assumption about the liquidation value of Asset 2 is required except that it is not greater
than the original value of $1oo.
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payments to offset his expected monitoring costs (ignoring the time value of
money). And since monitoring will fully prevent Debtor from misbehaving,
neither creditor will demand any additional compensation for expected
misconduct losses. Therefore, if Creditor i intends to monitor, misconduct risk
will cause Debtor's borrowing costs to be $3 higher than they would be
otherwise.
Under the pro rata rule, however, Creditor i will not monitor. It was
assumed that monitoring increases the liquidation value of Asset 1 by $20 if
insolvency occurs, and that insolvency is 25% likely. The expected combined
benefit to the creditors of monitoring is thus $5. But because the pro rata rule
divides Asset 1 evenly between the two creditors (on the assumption they are
owed the same amount), the "private" benefit to Creditor 1- that is, the benefit
he captures for himself-is only $2.50, which is less than his $3 monitoring
cost. Creditor i therefore will not monitor, and Debtor will misbehave. Instead
of charging $3 more in interest payments to offset his monitoring costs,
Creditor 1 will charge $2.50 more to offset his expected losses from
misconduct. And because Creditor 2 knows that Creditor 1 will not monitor,
she also will charge $2.50 more. Therefore, misconduct risk will increase
Debtor's borrowing costs by $5, as contrasted with $3 if Creditor 1 intended to
monitor. This $2 difference might make it unprofitable for Debtor to borrow in
the first place, creating a deadweight loss by causing Debtor to forgo a socially
valuable project.44
This example shows how the pro rata rule can cause creditors to fail to
monitor when monitoring would create social wealth. But the pro rata rule can
just as easily lead to excessive monitoring as well. This can be seen using the
same scenario, but with two changes. First, assume now that either creditor
could prevent Debtor from misbehaving in period two by spending $2 on
monitoring. Second, assume that neither creditor knows the costs the other
would have to incur to monitor successfully. With these new assumptions,
Creditor i will likely monitor, because his costs from doing so are less than his
expected private benefit. But there is a good chance that Creditor 2 will
monitor as well, because she will be unsure whether Creditor 1 intends to
monitor. And her monitoring efforts will be duplicative, in the sense that
Creditor i's efforts alone are sufficient to prevent the misconduct.4" Therefore,
44. In particular, this would happen if the expected benefit to Debtor of engaging in asset
substitution plus the expected profits from the project were less than $2. See supra note 39.
4S. Saul Levmore has also observed that the pro rata rule can lead to duplicative creditor
monitoring. See Levmore, supra note 33, at 54.
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misconduct risk might increase Debtor's borrowing costs by $4, even though
only $2 worth of monitoring is needed to protect both creditors. 46
Regardless of whether the result is too much monitoring or too little, the
underlying problem with the pro rata rule is that it prevents each creditor from
capturing the full benefits of his or her monitoring efforts. Put another way,
under the pro rata rule the costs of monitoring are private but the benefits are
social.47 As the scenario illustrates, this collective action problem results in too
little monitoring when monitoring is expensive, and too much when it is
cheap.48
3. Monitoring Under Symmetry
Symmetry improves creditor monitoring incentives relative to the pro rata
rule. Not only does it ameliorate the collective action problem, but it also
enhances the benefits of specialization.
46. Several commentators have focused on the alternative possibility under the pro rata rule that
creditors whose private monitoring benefits exceed their monitoring costs might refrain
from monitoring in hopes of free riding on the efforts of others. See id. at 53-54; Randal C.
Picker, Security Interests, Misbehavior, and Common Pools, 59 U. CHI. L. REv. 645, 665 (1992).
47. Creditors may try to "privatize" the benefits of their monitoring efforts by removing assets
from the debtor's estate before the debtor enters bankruptcy. See Picker, supra note 46, at
670. The prevention of such creditor misconduct is the province of bankruptcy law and
especially the doctrine of voidable preferences. By ignoring this possibility here, the implicit
assumption in my hypothetical is that these areas of law are operating effectively.
48. In theory, a debtor could try to overcome the pro rata rule's collective action problem by
hiring one creditor to monitor on behalf of all creditors. Under such a monitoring contract,
the designated monitor would promise to police the debtor's estate for misconduct, and the
promise would be enforceable by the debtor's trustee in bankruptcy. Such a contract would,
however, present several difficulties. First, creditors would have to incur costs to observe
such a contract and verify its ongoing enforceability. Second, creditors would have to incur
costs confirming the creditworthiness of the monitor. And third, a bankruptcy court may be
unable to distinguish losses in the debtor's estate due to misconduct from losses due to
normal business risk. This last possibility creates the risk that the monitor will in essence be
treated as the guarantor of all the debtor's obligations -a risk the monitor may be unwilling
to undertake at any interest rate the debtor is willing to pay. In the alternative, unsecured
creditors could hire a "bondholders' trustee" to monitor on their behalf-an arrangement
that has some precedent as a matter of practice. See Levmore, supra note 33, at 72-73. Such
arrangements present problems of their own, however, as the costs of contracting among
numerous unsecured creditors may be high, especially because individual creditors will
prefer to stay out of the contract but free ride on the benefits it provides. In addition, the
arrangement substitutes the risk that the trustee will misbehave for the risk that the debtor
will. See id.
118:806 2009
HeinOnline  -- 118 Yale L. J.  824 2008-2009
THE CASE FOR SYMMETRY IN CREDITORS' RIGHTS
To see how symmetry ameliorates the collective action problem, consider
again the three-period scenario described above, where Creditor 1 could protect
$5 of expected value in Asset 1 by spending $3 on monitoring. 49 As previously
noted, Debtor's borrowing costs would be lower on these assumptions if
Creditor 1 intended to monitor. And, under symmetry, he will. Symmetry
causes Creditor 1 to absorb the full impact of a drop in the value of Asset 1
whenever Debtor is insolvent and Asset 1 is underwater. Creditor 1 would
therefore capture the full $5 in expected benefits from his monitoring efforts,
making it worthwhile for him to monitor.
This example shows how symmetry reduces the risk that creditors will
monitor at suboptimal levels. But symmetry discourages excessive monitoring
as well. Note in the same scenario that depletion of Asset 1 has no impact on
Creditor 2 under symmetry, because her recovery now depends solely on the
value of Asset 2. Therefore, even if she could also monitor to prevent depletion
of Asset 1, she will not do so. And this is efficient because her monitoring
efforts would merely duplicate those of Creditor 1.
The manner in which symmetry allocates the impact of debtor misconduct
also creates efficiencies through specialization. Creditors are more likely to
monitor at efficient levels if a partitioning arrangement causes them to bear the
impact of the particular type of debtor misconduct they can most cheaply
prevent. The first step in creditor monitoring is the detection of misconduct,
which-as was previously observed-can be conceptualized as a mid-loan
reappraisal. And, as the discussion of appraisal costs indicated, symmetry
rewards Creditor 1 for specializing in appraising Asset 1, and Creditor 2 for
specializing in appraising Asset 2. This implies that it would be efficient if
symmetry also focused the impact of depletion of Asset 1 onto Creditor 1 and
the impact of depletion of Asset 2 onto Creditor 2. And symmetry does achieve
this result. Whenever Debtor is insolvent and Asset 1 is underwater, depletion
of Asset 1 harms only Creditor 1. And the same is true with respect to
Creditor 2 and Asset 2. Symmetry therefore encourages creditor monitoring in
49. In analyzing both symmetry and asymmetry, I will continue to assume that Creditors 1 and
2 are owed the same amount. A debtor could reduce the collective action problem under
both symmetry and asymmetry by increasing the degree to which it borrows from a single
creditor-just as it could under the pro rata rule. But this strategy will often be
impracticable, and it also precludes the efficiencies of specialization. By assuming that the
two creditors are owed the same amount, I focus the analysis on the relevant question for
my purposes: does asset partitioning improve monitoring incentives in situations where the
pro rata rule performs poorly -that is, where a debtor cannot easily borrow from just one
creditor, or the debtor's assets are differentiated enough to make specialization attractive?
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a way that builds upon the efficiencies it generates by enabling creditors to
specialize in their appraisal efforts."0
4. Monitoring Under Asymmetry: Asset 1
The nature of asymmetry makes it necessary to analyze the impact of
depletion of the two asset pools separately. I consider Asset i first.
Because asymmetry gives Creditor 1 a prior claim to Asset 1, we might
expect it to increase his incentive to monitor that pool, just as symmetry does.
Indeed, scholars have argued that various asymmetrical arrangements have
exactly this effect."1 But the opposite is true, as Figure I reveals.
5o. The only exception to this conclusion is when Debtor is insolvent but depletion occurs in an
asset pool that has remained above water. For example, when Debtor is insolvent but Asset 2
is worth more than Creditor 2's claim, depletion of Asset 2 under symmetry is absorbed
entirely by Creditor I (unless Creditor I lacks a deficiency claim, in which case it is absorbed
by Debtor). Conversely, in the insolvency outcome where Asset 1 is above water, depletion
of Asset i under symmetry is suffered by Creditor 2. In those situations, the creditor who
usually will be better at detecting the depletion will have less incentive to do something
about it. There are, however, several reasons to believe that this problem will be relatively
minor. First, it never arises in the insolvency outcome where both pools are underwater.
Second, in the outcomes where only one pool is underwater, it arises only with respect to
depletion of the above-water pool. And third, the problem is self-limiting because the act of
depletion tends to push the pool underwater, at which point the impact of any further
depletion shifts to the "right" creditor.
51. See, e.g., DOUGLAS G. BAIRD & THOMAS H. JACKSON, CASES, PROBLEMS, AND MATERIALS ON
SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY 324-28 (2d ed. 1987) (arguing that the secured
loan encourages the secured creditor to specialize in monitoring the secured assets); Katz,
supra note 19, at 85 (arguing that a guaranty on a loan is efficient when the lender can
monitor the borrower more cheaply than the guarantor's other creditors can).
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Figure i.
ASYMMETRY:
IMPACT OF DEPLETION OF ASSET 1 ON CREDITOR RECOVERIES
(ASSET 2 WORTH $100, EACH CREDITOR OWED $100)
$1.00
REDUCTION 
IN $0.80
CREDITOR
RECOVERY FROM
$1 IN ADDITIONAL
DEPLETION OF
ASSET 1 $0.40
$0.20 - ,
/ Creditor i
$0.00
$100 $80 $60 $40 $20 $0
VALUE OF ASSET 1
The figure shows the impact on each creditor of depletion of Asset 1 under
asymmetry when Debtor is insolvent.5 2 The horizontal axis represents
declining values of Asset I from $1oo to $o, and the vertical axis represents the
reduction in creditor recoveries caused by one dollar in additional depletion of
52. Figure 1 assumes that each creditor is owed $1oo and Asset 2 is worth $1oo. Its results are
derived as follows. Let C1 and C2 be the amounts owed Creditors 1 and 2, respectively, and
al and a2 be the respective values of the asset pools when liquidated. Further, let Xa be
Creditor i's recovery and Ya be Creditor 2's recovery under asymmetry when Debtor is
insolvent. Xa will equal C1 whenever Ci is less than or equal to al. Otherwise,
(i) Xa = al + a2*(( C1 -al)/ (Ci - al + C2)).
Ya will equal a2 + (al - Ci) if al > Ci. Otherwise,
(2) Ya = a2*( C2/ (C1 - al + C2)).
The curves in Figure 1 chart the first derivatives with respect to al of X. and Y,, which are as
follows:
(3) dXa/dai = + (-a2*C2) / (Ci - al + C2)2;
(4) dY./dal = (a2*C2) / (Ci - al +C2)2.
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that asset pool. The figure's two curves show, at each value of Asset 1, the
marginal impact of depletion on each of Creditors i and 2.51
Figure 1 reveals that, at higher values of Asset 1, asymmetry causes Creditor
2 rather than Creditor i to bear the brunt of Asset i's depletion. s4 The burden
shifts, however, as Asset 1 drops in value, with additional depletion being
absorbed increasingly by Creditor i. The result is a crossover point, which in
Figure 1 occurs at $59. When the value of Asset 1 is below that point, further
depletion harms Creditor 1 more than Creditor 2.15 But even at low values of
Asset 1, Creditor 2 continues to bear a significant portion of the impact of
marginal depletion.
These results can be explained as follows. By giving Creditor i a prior claim
to Asset i, asymmetry (like symmetry) has a focusing effect, meaning that it
increases the degree to which the value of Asset 1 determines Creditor i's
recovery. All other things being equal, this will cause Creditor i to absorb more
of the impact of Asset i's depletion. But asymmetry also gives Creditor 1 a
deficiency claim to Asset 2 that is paid pro rata with Creditor 2's claim. And
that deficiency claim has an insulating effect, meaning that it protects Creditor
i from depreciation of the assets to which he enjoys his prior claim.s6 Creditor
53. Figure 1 assumes the common law rule for asymmetrical arrangements, which is expressly
required by the Bankruptcy Code for secured loans. See supra note 12. For the general
partnership, the Bankruptcy Code instead dictates an anti-marshaling rule when both the
partnership and a partner are bankrupt. See supra note 15. Under this alternative rule, and
assuming the two creditors are owed the same amount, Creditor i's recovery from Asset 2 is
equal to the lesser of the deficiency in Asset 1 and 50% of the value of Asset 2. Charting the
impact of depletion of Asset 1 under this rule would produce a figure qualitatively similar to
Figure 1 but with more extreme differences in the relative positions of the creditors. Thus,
when the value of Asset 1 was above the crossover point, $1 in its depletion would harm
Creditor 2 by $i and Creditor 1 by $o. Below the crossover point the creditors would again
switch places, with further marginal depletion reducing Creditor 2's recovery by $o and
Creditor i's by $1. Finally, the crossover point would be at $5o rather than (as in Figure i)
$S9, reflecting an increase in the overall burden of depletion borne by Creditor 2.
54. For example, on the assumptions used in Figure i, one dollar of marginal depletion reduces
Creditor 2's recovery by $0.91 and Creditor i's recovery by $0.09, when Asset i is worth
$95. These results are computed using equations (3) and (4) in note 52.
55. When the value of Asset i is at the crossover point, the two creditors divide the marginal
impact of depletion based on the ratio between the amounts of their original claims, just as
they do under the pro rata rule.
56. The deficiency claims creditors enjoy under symmetry also have an insulating effect, but it is
weaker, discouraging monitoring only when Debtor is solvent. Thus, in the limited liability
alternative, Creditor 1 has no deficiency claim to Asset 2 and consequently absorbs the full
impact of depletion of Asset i whenever Asset i is underwater. By contrast, in the version of
symmetry where Creditor 1 has a deficiency claim, underwater depletion of Asset 1 does not
i18:8o6 2009
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i's deficiency claim to Asset 2 is in essence an insurance policy on Asset i, and
like any insurance policy it shifts loss from the beneficiary (Creditor 1) to the
insurer (Creditor 2, who would otherwise keep Asset 2 for herself when Debtor
fell bankrupt). When Asset 1 is worth $100, the insulating effect dominates the
focusing effect, causing Creditor 2 to absorb most of Asset i's depletion. But
the insulating effect weakens as Asset i drops in value, which is why Creditor i
eventually takes over as the primary victim of Asset i's depletion. The
insulating effect weakens because, as Asset 1 drops in value, Asset 2 becomes
increasingly inadequate to cover both Creditor 2's claim and Creditor i's
(growing) deficiency claim. But the fact that there is value in Asset 2 prevents
the insulating effect from disappearing altogether, which is why, even at low
values of Asset 1, Creditor 2 continues to bear a significant fraction of the
impact of Asset i's marginal depletion.17
Three features of Figure 1 are particularly important to the analysis of
creditor monitoring incentives. First, we see that asymmetry does little to
overcome the collective action problem created by the pro rata rule. Over most
values of Asset 1 depicted in this figure, each creditor suffers significantly less
than ioo% of the impact of one dollar in marginal depletion, just as is true
under the pro rata rule.,8 Asymmetry therefore will, like the pro rata rule,
harm him as long as there is a surplus in Asset 2 large enough to keep Debtor solvent. In
that case, Creditor 1 is insulated from the impact of marginal depletion, which instead is
borne by Debtor.
s. The relative strengths of the insulating and focusing effects determine the location of the
crossover point, which can be shifted by changing the values of the asset pools. For example,
the insulating effect would be weaker if depletion of Asset 1 occurred when Asset 2 were
underwater. Like any insurance policy, Creditor i's deficiency claim will provide less
protection if the assets backing the policy drop in value. Devaluation of Asset 2 would thus
shift the crossover point in Figure 1 to the left, reflecting a transfer from Creditor 2 to
Creditor i of the impact of depletion of Asset i. Conversely, if Asset 2 were above water, the
insulating effect would be stronger, shifting the crossover point to the right. Assuming that
Asset 2 is above water would also cause Debtor to be solvent at the higher values of Asset 1
depicted in the figure, in which case Debtor rather than the creditors would suffer the
impact of marginal depletion. These observations are equally true under the anti-marshaling
rule applied to the American general partnership. See supra note 52.
58. An exception, not shown in the graph, is that Creditor 2 bears the full impact of depletion of
Asset 1 when it is above water but Debtor is insolvent. The difference with symmetry is that,
once depletion pushes Asset 1 underwater, under symmetry the impact of further depletion
shifts entirely to Creditor i. See supra note 50. In contrast, Creditor 2 continues to bear the
brunt of depletion ofAsset I under asymmetry, as Figure I shows.
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produce too little monitoring when monitoring is expensive, and too much
when it is cheap. 9
Second, when asymmetry does overcome the collective action problem-
that is, at relatively high values of Asset 1-it does so by concentrating the
impact of Asset i's depletion onto the "wrong" creditor: Creditor 2. As I
observed when discussing appraisal costs, asymmetry encourages the creditor
who can appraise Asset 1 more cheaply to assume the position of Creditor i.
Because the first step of monitoring can be likened to a midcourse reappraisal,
it follows that Creditor i rather than Creditor 2 will also usually be the low-cost
protector of Asset i's value. Therefore, when asymmetry concentrates the
impact of depletion of Asset i onto a particular creditor, it concentrates it onto
6,the one who will find that depletion relatively expensive to prevent.
Third, Figure 1 shows that the marginal impact of depletion on each
creditor changes as the value of Asset 1 falls. For example, one dollar in
depletion reduces Creditor i's recovery by $0.41 when Asset i is worth $70, but
by $0.65 when Asset 1 is worth $30.61 And the impact on Creditor 2 is different
at these two points as well. This marks a departure from both the pro rata rule
and symmetry, under which the marginal impact of depletion does not depend
on the value of Asset 1 as long as Debtor is insolvent. 62 For this reason,
asymmetry puts an additional burden on a creditor who wishes to estimate
whether monitoring will be cost justified. Under both the pro rata rule and
symmetry, a creditor who seeks to calculate the private benefit of monitoring to
5g. This defect of asymmetry is less severe under the anti-marshaling rule applied to the
American general partnership, which causes one creditor or the other to suffer the full
impact of marginal depletion as long as the depletion range does not include the crossover
point. But when depletion does cause the value of Asset i to cross that point, its impact is
split between the creditors, precluding the efficiencies of full loss internalization. See supra
note 52.
6o. This problem is even worse under the anti-marshaling rule applied to the American general
partnership, which further increases Creditor i's percentage recovery on his deficiencq claim
and hence the degree to which Creditor 2 suffers the impact of depletion of Asset 1. See supra
note 52.
61. These results are rounded to the nearest penny, and are computed using equation (3) in note
52.
6a. For example, in the scenario used previously to analyze monitoring under both the pro rata
rule and symmetry, the impact of a $20 drop in Asset 1 on both creditors would not have
depended on whether Asset 1 depreciated from $90 to $70 or from $So to $30. In either
case, the impact would have been split between the creditors equally under the pro rata rule,
and would have been borne entirely by Creditor i under symmetry. A qualification is that
the marginal impact of depletion under symmetry depends not only on whether Debtor is
insolvent, but also on whether the pool being depleted is underwater.
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prevent a given amount of depletion needs only to estimate the probability that
the debtor will fall insolvent.61 But to make the same calculation under
asymmetry, a creditor must estimate not only the insolvency risk, but also the
precise value to which the debtor's assets will fall before they are liquidated.6 4
As a consequence, monitoring under asymmetry is costlier for all creditors,
which will translate into higher borrowing costs for the debtor.
In combination, these observations cast doubt on scholarly claims that
various asymmetrical arrangements generate monitoring efficiencies, at least
with respect to monitoring of Asset 1.6s Instead of improving the incentives of
creditors to monitor Asset 1 at efficient levels, a switch from the pro rata rule to
asymmetry is more likely to undermine them.
5. Monitoring Under Asymmetry: Asset 2
The story on monitoring under asymmetry only slightly improves when we
turn to Asset 2. In particular, a switch from the pro rata rule to asymmetry
causes Creditor 2 to capture more of the benefits of monitoring Asset 2, though
not to the same extent that a switch to symmetry would. This sole benefit of
asymmetry with respect to monitoring Asset 2 is unlikely to offset asymmetry's
strong diseconomies with respect to monitoring of Asset 1.
As was true of symmetry, asymmetry causes Creditor 2 to bear the full
impact of Asset 2's depletion when Debtor is insolvent but Asset 1 is above
water. Otherwise, the creditors divide the impact of Asset 2's depletion based
on the relationship between Creditor 2'S claim and the deficiency in Asset 1.
Interestingly, this means that the marginal impact of Asset 2's depletion
depends not on the value of Asset 2, but rather on the value of Asset 1, which
determines the size of Creditor i's deficiency claim. Figure 2 charts this
relationship.
63. Under symmetry, the creditor must also consider the probability that the asset pool to
which the creditor enjoys a prior claim will fall underwater.
64. This problem also arises under the anti-marshaling rule applied to the American general
partnership, which causes the marginal impact of depletion on each creditor to depend not
only on whether Debtor falls insolvent, but also on whether the depletion occurs when Asset
1 is above or below the crossover point. See supra note 53.
65. See sources cited supra notes 28 and 51.
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Figure 2.
ASYMMETRY:
IMPACT OF DEPLETION OF ASSET 2 ON CREDITOR RECOVERIES
(EACH CREDITOR OWED $100)
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The horizontal axis represents declining values of Asset 1 from $1OO to $o,
and the vertical axis represents the reduction in creditor recoveries caused by
one dollar in additional depletion of Asset 2.66 The figure's two curves show,
for each value of Asset 1, the marginal impact of depletion of Asset 2 on each
creditor. 67
66. Figure 2 assumes that each creditor is owed $1oo. No assumption is made about the value of
Asset 2 save that it is not above water. The results in the figure are derived as follows:
Equations (1) and (2) in supra note 52 give creditor recoveries under asymmetry. Figure 2
graphs the first derivatives of these equations with respect to a2, which are as follows:
(5) dXa/ da2 = (Ci - al) / (Ci - al + C2);
(6) dYa/da2 = C2 / (C1 - al + C2).
67. As was true of Figure 1, Figure 2 reflects the rule for asymmetrical arrangements preferred
by the common law and explicitly required by the Bankruptcy Code for the secured loan.
Once again, a chart showing the impact of the anti-marshaling rule that the Bankruptcy
Code applies to the general partnership would reflect a more severe version of asymmetry.
See supra notes 12, 15. In that case, and with the other assumptions used in Figure 2, $1 in
depletion of Asset 2 would harm Creditor 2 by $1, and Creditor 1 by $o, as long as the value
of Asset 2 were more than twice the amount of the deficiency in Asset i. But if that crossover
point were passed because of a decrease in the value of either asset pool, further marginal
depletion ofAsset 2 would reduce each creditor's recovery by $o.5o.
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Figure 2 reveals that, as Asset i drops in value, depletion of Asset 2 is
absorbed increasingly by Creditor i. The analogy to an insurance policy is
again useful: the larger the insurance claim asserted by the policyholder
(Creditor 1, whose deficiency claim grows as Asset 1 drops in value), the more
the policyholder suffers from devaluation of the assets backing the policy
(Asset 2). The main difference with Figure i is that there is no point at which
Asset 2's depletion harms Creditor 1 more than Creditor 2. This is because of
the assumption that both creditors are owed the same amount, which means
that Creditor i's deficiency claim can never be larger than Creditor 2's claim.
6 8
These results suggest that a switch from the pro rata rule to asymmetry
may slightly improve creditor incentives to monitor Asset 2. This is because of
loss internalization: Creditor 2 bears more of the impact of depletion of Asset 2
under asymmetry than she does under the pro rata rule. But the effect is
weaker than under symmetry, where she absorbs the full impact of Asset 2's
depletion whenever Debtor is insolvent and Asset 2 is underwater. And the fact
that her private benefits from protecting Asset 2 depend on the precise value of
Asset i is perverse given that Creditor 1 usually will be able to appraise Asset 1
more cheaply.
For these reasons, the social benefits that asymmetry might generate in
terms of monitoring Asset 2 are unlikely to offset its strong diseconomies with
respect to monitoring of Asset 1. Taken as a whole, these observations suggest
that a switch from the pro rata rule to asymmetry will rarely provide a net
improvement in creditor monitoring incentives, and indeed in many situations
will raise monitoring costs in a manner that destroys social wealth.
6. A Separate Note on Debt Dilution
The discussion of monitoring incentives to this point has addressed only
the first of the two types of debtor misconduct I previously defined: asset
depletion. But the relative monitoring benefits of the pro rata rule, symmetry,
and asymmetry are the same with respect to debt dilution. As defined
previously, debt dilution occurs when a debtor takes on liabilities without at
the same time acquiring recoverable assets worth enough to prevent its ratio of
assets to liabilities from falling. The paradigmatic example is tort liability. As is
true for asset depletion, the pro rata rule distributes the impact of tort liability
among creditors based on the relative amounts of their claims. Symmetry, in
turn, focuses the impact of tort liability on particular creditors in a way that
68. These conclusions are equally true under the anti-marshaling rule applied to the American
general partnership. See supra note 67.
HeinOnline  -- 118 Yale L. J.  833 2008-2009
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
reinforces the benefits of creditor specialization. For example, the corporate
form concentrates the impact of business torts onto the corporate creditors,
and it likewise focuses the impact of torts committed by shareholders in their
personal capacities onto personal creditors. 69 Finally, the impact of tort liability
under asymmetry roughly tracks the impact of asset depletion as depicted in
Figures 1 and 2. For example, the asymmetry of the American general
partnership will often cause the partners' personal creditors rather than the
partnership creditors to absorb the brunt of tort liability incurred by
partnership agents. And these same personal creditors will also suffer most of
the impact of tort liability incurred by partners in their personal capacities,
though not to the same extent they would under the (symmetrical) jingle rule.
There is, however, an important difference between debt dilution and asset
depletion that may make creditors less likely to monitor to prevent debt
dilution generally. As was noted previously, asymmetry raises monitoring costs
by causing the marginal impact of asset depletion to depend on the precise
value of the debtor's estate. When it comes to debt dilution, this problem arises
not only under asymmetry but also under the pro rata rule and symmetry.
Thus, under the pro rata rule, a tort claimant's percentage recovery falls as the
size of its claim increases. This means that a contract creditor who wishes to
calculate the private benefit from monitoring to prevent a $1 increase in the
debtor's tort liability must estimate not only the risk of the debtor's insolvency,
but also the amount of the total tort claims against the debtor. 1 And debt
dilution under symmetry displays the same pattern.72 This means that,
69. See Hansmann et al., supra note i, at 1346 (arguing that creditors who have prior claims to a
firm's assets but only subordinated claims to the owners' other assets will monitor to
prevent excessive borrowing by the firm's managers).
7o. Assume under asymmetry that Assets i and 2 are worth $1oo each and Creditors 1 and 2 are
owed $1oo each. Assume further that a tort victim who is owed $80 is given a claim
equivalent to Creditor l's: a prior claim to Asset i plus a pro rata deficiency claim to Asset 2.
On these assumptions, and using the anti-marshaling rule applied to the American general
partnership, see sources cited supra note 12, Creditor i would recover $91 while Creditor 2
would recover only $36 (with the rest of the value in Debtor's estate- $73-going to the tort
claimant).
71. Assume that Assets 1 and 2 are worth $1oo each, Creditors i and 2 are owed $1oo each, and
Debtor incurs a tort liability of $50. Under the pro rata rule, that tort liability would reduce
the recoveries of each of Creditors 1 and 2 in a liquidation proceeding by $20, from $1oo to
$80. But if the tort claim were doubled to $ioo, the recoveries of each of Creditors 1 and 2
would further decline from $8o to $67, for a marginal impact of $13. In other words, the
marginal impact of the tort claim falls as the amount of the claim rises.
P. For example, assume under symmetry that Asset 1 is worth $ioo and Creditor 1 is owed
$ioo. If a $50 tort claim were assigned to Asset i and then Debtor's assets were liquidated,
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regardless of the partitioning arrangement, a creditor will find it relatively
expensive to estimate whether monitoring to prevent debt dilution will prove
worthwhile.
D. Asset Partitioning and Speedier Bankruptcy Proceedings
Hansmann, Kraakman, and I previously identified a third economic benefit
of asset partitioning: quicker distribution of assets to creditors in bankruptcy
proceedings. 73 Faster liquidation of debtor assets generates social wealth on the
assumption that creditors can earn higher returns on a bankrupt debtor's
capital by reinvesting it elsewhere. This assumption is justified because the fact
of default implies a failure to put capital to optimal use, and because the
disruptive effect of bankruptcy tends to reduce the value of a debtor's business
as a going concern.
74
Analysis using the simple model indicates that the three partitioning
variations fall along a continuum with respect to bankruptcy speed. Symmetry
is more efficient than asymmetry, especially as applied to multiowner entities
such as partnerships. And asymmetry in turn is more efficient than the pro rata
rule. This roughly parallels the results with respect to appraisal costs, but not
creditor monitoring, for which only symmetry offers a general efficiency
improvement over the pro rata rule.
To analyze how asset partitioning can expedite a liquidation proceeding, 75 I
will again use the pro rata version of the simple model to mark a baseline.
Creditor 1 would recover $67, which would mean that the marginal impact on him of the
tort claim would be $33. But if the tort claim were doubled to $1oo, Creditor i would
recover $5o, making the marginal impact of the additional $50 in tort liability only $17.
73. Hansmann et al., supra note i, at 1346. Although we focused on speedier bankruptcies as a
benefit of entity shielding, we noted how rules that shield owner assets (such as limited
liability) can provide similar benefits. Id. at 1381-82.
74. For example, bankruptcy subjects the debtor to court oversight and distracts managers by
making them fear for their jobs. Steven L. Schwarcz, The Easy Case for the Priority of Secured
Claims in Bankruptcy, 47 DuKE L.J. 425, 454 (1997).
75. Most bankruptcies end in liquidation. See Warren & Westbrook, supra note 7, at 1212
(finding that two-thirds of federal bankruptcies arc liquidations rather than
reorganizations). Asset partitioning is less likely to matter to the speed of a reorganization
since the goal is to salvage the debtor as a going concern rather than divide its assets.
Nevertheless, symmetry may expedite reorganizations by permitting the assignment of asset
pools to different courts, such as when a corporate reorganization is handled separately from
the bankruptcy of individual shareholders. In that situation, the corporation's symmetry
would reduce the reorganization's informational complexity, which might speed its
resolution.
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Assume that Debtor has entered bankruptcy, and the bankruptcy court needs
six days to verify the claim of Creditor 1, plus another four days to verify the
claim of Creditor 2.76 Because the pro rata rule pays each creditor the
percentage of Debtor's assets equal to the amount owed that creditor divided
by the amount owed both creditors, the court must verify the claims of both
creditors before it can distribute assets to either. If we also assume for
simplicity's sake that valuation of asset pools does not require any marginal
expenditure of court time-perhaps because, while the court is verifying
creditor claims, assets are converted to cash in an auction supervised by a
clerk-then ten days must pass under the pro rata rule before any value in
Debtor's estate can be distributed to either creditor.
Now switch to symmetry. Creditor 2's recovery from Asset 2 no longer
depends on the amount of Creditor i's claim, which means that a court would
have to verify only Creditor 2's claim before making the first asset distribution.
If Assets 1 and 2 are of equal value when Debtor falls insolvent, then the court
could distribute half the value of Debtor's assets after four days.7 The court
would then spend another six days verifying Creditor i's claim, meaning that
the other half of the value in Debtor's estate could be distributed after a total of
ten days. The average expected time to distribute any given dollar of value in
Debtor's estate would therefore be seven days, in contrast with ten days under
the pro rata rule.
Finally, consider asymmetry. Because Creditor 2's recovery from Asset 2
depends on the size of Creditor i's deficiency claim, a court cannot determine
the amount of Creditor 2's recovery from Asset 2 before it both verifies
Creditor i's claim and determines the value of Asset 1. This is a disadvantage
relative to symmetry whenever, as is assumed here, Creditor 2's claim can be
verified more quickly. In the numerical example used above, the court will now
spend six days before distributing Asset i, and another four days (or ten total)
before distributing Asset 2. The average expected time to distribute any given
dollar of value in Debtor's estate is eight days, in contrast with seven under
symmetry and ten under the pro rata rule.""
76. Verification of creditor claims is time consuming because, for example, the claims might be
challenged as fraudulent conveyances.
7. If Asset 2 is above water, its surplus will be distributed to Creditor 1 after his claim is
verified, unless Debtor enjoys limited liability. And the converse is true if Asset 1 is above
water.
78. This would be true regardless of whether the marshaling or anti-marshaling rule were used
to determine recoveries from Asset 2. See supra note 12.
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Symmetry is also the most efficient arrangement if each asset pool is
assigned to a different court, such as when a partnership and its partners fall
bankrupt and different tribunals handle the estates of the partnership and of
each individual partner.79 As an illustration, take again the same numerical
example, but assume that Creditor 1 and Asset 1 are assigned to Judge 1, and
Creditor 2 and Asset 2 are assigned to Judge 2. Under the pro rata rule, neither
judge could distribute any of Debtor's assets until both had verified the claims
before them. Therefore, Judge 2 would verify Creditor 2's claim after four days,
but she could not distribute any assets until Judge i had finished verifying
Creditor i's claim two days later, with the consequence that none of Debtor's
assets could be distributed before the end of the sixth day. Asymmetry would
produce the same result, because again Judge 2 would be unable to distribute
any assets until Judge i had verified the amount of Creditor i's claim. This
example shows that, when Debtor's estate is split between courts, asymmetry is
more efficient than the pro rata rule only when Creditor i's claim can be
verified more quickly. Under symmetry, in contrast, Judge 2 would not need to
wait on Judge 1, and could distribute Asset 2 after four days. Two days later,
Judge 1 would distribute Asset 1. Assuming again that the values of the two
asset pools are the same, the average expected time before any given dollar is
distributed is five days under symmetry, as contrasted with six days under both
the pro rata rule and asymmetry.
The relative inefficiency of asymmetry will be even greater when there are
multiple Asset 2s, such as in the partnership context, where Asset 2 corresponds
to the personal estates of individual partners. When an American general
partnership fails, its asymmetry prevents courts that are handling concurrent
bankruptcies of individual partners from distributing any assets until the court
handling the partnership estate has confirmed the validity and amount of each
partnership creditor's claim. 8' Because commercial affairs tend to be more
complex than personal affairs, a rule that makes the final recovery of personal
creditors from personal assets wait on the settlement of the partnership estate
is particularly wasteful. 81 And the inefficiency of the American partnership rule
79. Indeed, the opportunity to divide up partnership bankruptcies in this fashion was probably
the impetus for the creation of the jingle rule by English courts after Parliament introduced
a formal bankruptcy system in the sixteenth century. See Hansmann et al., supra note i, at
1381-82.
so. See ii U.S.C. § 723(c) (2000) (providing that courts handling the estates of individual
partners must make pro rata distributions based .on "the full amount of all claims of
creditors allowed in the case concerning such partnership").
81. See id. § 723(d) (providing that the final distribution of personal assets to personal creditors
is not made until the amount of each partnership creditor's deficiency claim is determined).
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rises with the number of partners because all personal proceedings must await
determination of the amounts of the partnership creditors' claims.82
E. Asymmetry as a Means for Debtor Opportunism
The preceding discussion brings us to this question: why would debtors
ever choose an asymmetrical arrangement? Symmetry is superior in terms of
appraisal costs, creditor monitoring, and bankruptcy speed, and in a
competitive market creditors will pass these benefits back to the debtor in the
form of lower interest rates. The implication is that business organizers in the
United States will always choose a symmetrical entity (such as a limited
liability company) over the asymmetrical American general partnership. And
debtors who borrow on a secured basis will always negotiate for clauses that
subordinate or waive the secured creditors' deficiency claims, rendering the
loans symmetrical.8 3 Yet American general partnerships and (asymmetrical)
secured loans abound, and thus demand explanation.
One explanation is transaction costs. Debtors must contract around default
rules of asymmetry, and there will be settings where the costs of doing so
exceed symmetry's relative efficiencies. The costs of contracting into symmetry
are probably trivial for a secured loan, which can be made symmetrical by
inserting a one-line subordination or waiver clause into a loan agreement that
is likely to be negotiated anyway. But contracting costs may often be important
in the context of the general partnership, which arises by default whenever
individuals share the profits of a business venture,84 and whose alternatives,
82. Frank Kennedy noted that under the American rule, "distribution of any dividends in the
partner's case would be hazardous in view of the uncertainty pending the arrival of that time
when the amount of what will ordinarily be the largest claim against the estate [that is, the
partnership creditors' claim] has been determined." Frank R. Kennedy, Partnerships and
Partners Under the Bankruptcy Code: Claims and Distribution, 40 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 55, 71
(1983). Despite this disadvantage, Kennedy endorsed the American rule, arguing that the
jingle rule constitutes "a serious departure from the basic rule of the common law of
partnerships that the separate property of each partner is as fully liable for the payment of
partnership debts as for his individual debts." Frank R. Kennedy, A New Deal for Partnership
Bankruptcy, 6o COLUM. L. REV. 61o, 631 (196o). Kennedy's characterization of the jingle rule
is misleading. A partner's personal property is "fully liable" for partnership debt under both
the jingle rule and the American rule. The only difference is in how the shortfall is
apportioned among creditors when that rule of full liability causes the claims against the
property to exceed its value.
83. Secured creditors in fact often do agree to waive their deficiency claims, making their loans
nonrecourse. See infra Section II.G.
84. UNIF. P'SHip Acr 202(a) (amended 1997), 6 U.L.A. 92 (2001).
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such as the corporation, require a formal agreement, public registration, and
payment of franchise taxes and other fees." s
A second explanation is that a debtor who chooses symmetry does not
capture all the social benefits for itself. Some creditors will be unaware of the
debtor's partitioning arrangement when they extend credit and hence will not
reward the debtor for choosing symmetry. But these creditors may nonetheless
benefit if symmetry causes another creditor to monitor. Perhaps more
importantly, symmetry speeds the distribution of debtor assets to all creditors
in a bankruptcy proceeding, regardless of whether the creditors were aware of
the partitioning rules when they extended credit. In these ways, symmetry
generates positive externalities, and thus will be underutilized (unless
lawmakers subsidize it, such as by making it the default rule).
A third, and likely most important, explanation for the widespread use of
asymmetry is opportunism, by which I mean the use of asset partitioning to
transfer wealth away from creditors who will not adjust to subordination of
their claims. The division of debtor assets in a liquidation proceeding is a zero-
sum game, and asymmetry tilts the playing field to favor some creditors over
others. In the terms of the simple model, asymmetry ensures that Creditor 1
will recover a higher percentage on his claim than Creditor 2 does when Debtor
falls bankrupt (unless Asset 1 has depreciated to nothing, in which case the
creditors recover pro rata). For this reason, a creditor will charge a lower
interest rate if the debtor adopts an asymmetrical arrangement and slots that
creditor into the advantaged position. And if this interest rate discount is
greater than the relative social benefits of symmetry that the debtor captures
(minus symmetry's higher transaction costs, if any), the debtor will choose the
asymmetrical arrangement even though symmetry would be more efficient.
Importantly, an attempt to use asymmetry to transfer wealth would be
foiled if the disadvantaged creditors responded to the debtor's adoption of an
asymmetrical arrangement by demanding a higher interest rate, or by refusing
to lend in the first place. But many creditors are "nonadjusting," meaning that
they cannot or will not punish a debtor who acts opportunistically toward
them.86 To deter opportunistic use of asymmetry, creditors must screen to
8s. See Delaware Limited Liability Company Act § 18-201(b), DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, S 18-201
(2005) (detailing the filing requirement to form an LLC); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 103
(2001) (detailing the filing, fee, and tax requirements for incorporation); Franchise, i St. Tax
Guide: All Sts. (CCH) 5-200 to -955 (2006) (summarizing franchise fees for
incorporation in each state).
86. The term "nonadjusting creditor" was coined by Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried. See
Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 2, at 864. But the idea has roots in the works of others. See, e.g.,
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make sure they are not lending into the short end of an asymmetrical
arrangement, and they must negotiate and enforce loan covenants prohibiting
adoption of asymmetry after credit is extended. Such steps are unavailable to
involuntary tort claimants, and they are of limited use to government bodies
and regulated firms, such as utilities, who charge statutory interest rates that
do not vary with credit risk.8 7 Finally, contract creditors with small claims will
be "rationally" nonadjusting if the screening and monitoring costs they would
have to incur to prevent opportunism are greater than the amounts they stand
to lose from subordination of their claims.88 Rationally nonadjusting creditors
will instead impute subordination risk into the interest rate they charge all
debtors -a strategy that does not deter opportunism because the debtor pays
these creditors the same interest rate regardless of whether it acts
opportunistically. Research by Elizabeth Warren and Jay Westbrook suggests
that nonadjusting creditors hold a significant fraction of the total debt owed by
bankrupt debtors. 89 They must: there is no other reason for asymmetrical asset
partitioning to persist.
As was noted in the earlier discussion of creditor monitoring, debtors do
not need asset partitioning to privilege some creditors over others. Even under
the pro rata rule, a debtor can advantage a creditor by deliberately engaging in
debt dilution -that is, by promising to pay that creditor more in present value
terms than the value of the recoverable assets the creditor has contributed to
the debtor's estate. But such misconduct, at least in its most egregious forms, is
policed by the law of fraudulent conveyances.9" In contrast, asymmetry ensures
that some creditors will recover a higher percentage on their claims than others
do in a bankruptcy proceeding even if all creditors have contributed assets
BAIRD & JACKSON, supra note 51, at 327; Lynn M. LoPucki, The Unsecured Creditor's Bargain,
80 VA. L. REv. 1887, 1897 (1994).
87. See Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 2, at 884; Warren & Westbrook, supra note 7, at 1216.
88. Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 2, at 885-87.
89. In particular, Warren and Westbrook found that more than a quarter of unsecured debt was
owed to creditors whom the authors deemed likely to be nonadjusting. Warren &
Westbrook, supra note 7, at 1236. The actual percentage may be higher because the authors
excluded all trade debt, even though trade creditors are the most common type of unsecured
creditor, id. at 1224, and at least some of them are likely to be nonadjusting.
go. UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER AcT § 5(a), 7A U.L.A. 129 (2oo6) (allowing an obligation to
be set aside if the debtor was insolvent when it was incurred and did not receive "reasonably
equivalent value" in exchange).
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worth as much as their claims. 9' And fraudulent conveyance doctrine does not
forbid this type of wealth transfer.
Because it transfers wealth, asymmetry also destroys wealth. I have already
observed how the chance to seize wealth from nonadjusting creditors will cause
debtors to forgo symmetry's relative appraisal, monitoring, and bankruptcy-
speed efficiencies. But there are direct social costs of opportunistic use of
asymmetry as well. Thus, the expected wealth transfer produced by asymmetry
will lead to overinvestment by artificially depressing the interest rate demanded
by the advantaged creditor. 92 In addition, creditors who are "adjusting" will
incur screening and monitoring costs to protect themselves from subordination
risk. Importantly, adjusting creditors will incur these costs regardless of
whether the debtor in fact adopts an asymmetrical arrangement, which means
that the availability of asymmetry imposes social costs even when all creditors
are adjusting and hence no wealth transfer occurs. Moreover, adjusting
creditors will demand higher interest rates to reflect their anticipated
monitoring costs, which will produce a deadweight loss by making it
unprofitable on the margin for debtors to secure funding for wealth-creating
projects. These direct costs of opportunism mean that, even in settings where
appraisal, monitoring, and bankruptcy-speed efficiencies are unimportant, the
debtor's mere option to adopt asymmetry will destroy social wealth.
F. Asset Shifting and "Imbalanced" Debtors
Unlike asymmetry, symmetry does not ensure some creditors that they will
fare better than others if their debtor falls bankrupt. Thus, whether Creditor i
recovers a higher percentage on his claim than Creditor 2 does under symmetry
depends on the relative values of Debtor's asset pools when bankruptcy occurs,
and the future value of a debtor's assets is uncertain at the time of lending.
This does not mean, however, that debtors cannot manipulate symmetrical
arrangements opportunistically. In particular, debtors can engage in what I will
call asset shifting, meaning that they can transfer value among asset pools to
alter the relative riskiness of creditor claims. 93 For example, Debtor might shift
91. See Steven L. Harris & Charles W. Mooney, Jr., A Property-Based Theoty of Security Interests:
Taking Debtors' Choices Seriously, 8o VA. L. REV. 2021, 2030 (1994) (summarizing literature
which argues that secured borrowing reduces unsecured creditors' expected recoveries).
92. See Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 2, at 919 (arguing that the secured loan causes
overinvestment).
93. A third form of opportunism is caused by limited liability in particular, which gives business
organizers incentive to form corporations (and other limited liability entities) to reduce tort
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value from Asset 2 to Asset 1 in exchange for an interest rate discount from
Creditor 1. Although asset shifting is also a hazard under asymmetry, it is more
likely under symmetry, where Creditor 1 has more to lose from a shortfall in
Asset i and therefore will offer Debtor a larger inducement to shift value into
that pool.
Like the expected wealth transfer produced by asymmetry, asset shifting
can destroy social wealth. To see this, imagine under symmetry that Creditors 1
and 2 each lend $100, and Debtor then engages in asset shifting that makes
Asset i worth $120 and Asset 2 worth $8o. The resulting arrangement is
symmetrical as I define that term, because each creditor enjoys a prior claim to
a distinct asset pool. But the arrangement is imbalanced, with the ratio of Asset
i's value to Creditor i's claim being 5o% larger than the ratio of Asset 2's value
to Creditor 2's claim. And this imbalance undercuts two social benefits of
symmetry. First, it increases the likelihood that Asset 1 will remain above
water, and hence contribute to Creditor 2's recovery, when Debtor falls
insolvent. Therefore, if Creditor 2 were to conserve on her appraisal efforts by
focusing solely on Asset 2, she would know less about her overall risk exposure
than she would in a "balanced" symmetrical arrangement.9 4 Second, if Debtor
were to deplete Asset 1, the initial $20 of depletion would be borne by Creditor
2 rather than Creditor i, which undermines monitoring efficiencies since
Creditor i will usually be able to appraise Asset 1 more cheaply.9s In addition,
opportunistic asset shifting under symmetry will generate the same direct
social costs that asymmetry does. Thus, the interest rate discount Creditor 1
offers in exchange for the asset shift may produce overinvestment, and the risk
of asset shifting will cause creditors to incur monitoring costs to protect
themselves, which in turn may result in a deadweight loss in the credit market.
The fact that asset shifting can destroy wealth presents an important
practical question to my argument that symmetry is more efficient than
claimant recoveries. See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Toward Unlimited
Shareholder Liability for Corporate Torts, loo YALE L.J. 1879, 1882 (1991). I do not focus on
this form of opportunism here because I do not advocate that asymmetrical arrangements be
reformed to provide limited liability as a default rule.
94. On the other hand, Creditor 1 by appraising only Asset i might learn somewhat more about
his overall risk exposure than he would in a balanced arrangement, because the imbalance in
his favor makes it less likely that he will have to resort to his deficiency claim. This efficiency
may be offset, however, by the fact that Asset i is larger and thus potentially more expensive
to appraise.
95. The impact of the asset shift on bankruptcy speed is ambiguous. If Creditor i's claim can be
verified more quickly, then shifting value into Asset 1 speeds the distribution of assets;
otherwise, the asset shift slows it.
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asymmetry. If lawmakers were to reform asymmetrical arrangements to be
symmetrical as a default rule, 6 would debtors rechannel their opportunism
efforts into asset shifting on a scale that fully nullified symmetry's relative
social benefits?
There is good reason to conclude that the answer is no. To see this,
consider that asymmetry (on the one hand) and symmetry plus asset shifting
(on the other) are alternate routes to the same goal: a wealth transfer away
from nonadjusting creditors.97 When both routes are open, a debtor will
choose whichever is cheaper for the debtor per dollar of wealth transferred. In
either case, the costs of opportunism borne by the debtor are the transaction
costs of arranging the transfer plus any efficiencies that the debtor would
capture but that opportunism undermines. Under current law, both routes are
available, and both are used. Legal reform that closed the asymmetry route
would have no effect on debtors for whom symmetry plus asset shifting is
cheaper, as they would opt against asymmetry in any event. But debtors who
prefer asymmetry would experience the loss of that option as an increase in
their wealth-transfer costs. And these debtors necessarily would cut back on
the volume of wealth they transfer, because a debtor will only engage in
opportunism as long as the benefit exceeds the marginal cost. In short, denying
access to asymmetry would raise the price of opportunism for some debtors
without lowering it for others, causing the quantity of opportunism demanded
to fall.
Smaller wealth transfers, in turn, would mean less destruction of social
value from overinvestment and deadweight loss, which are the social costs of
opportunism the debtor does not bear. 98 Both overinvestment and deadweight
losses result from interest rate distortions, and hence will be a linear function
of the amount of wealth transferred opportunistically.
96. Asymmetry presents an opportunism problem only when it is a default rule, because in that
case it enables a debtor to transfer wealth away from creditors without their consent. Under
a regime where symmetry is the default rule, debtors could still opt into asymmetry by
contracting for it expressly. But the need to obtain consent from the disadvantaged creditors
would eliminate the opportunism problem. In the terms of the simple model, Debtor cannot
use asymmetry to transfer wealth away from Creditor 2 if Debtor needs her express consent
to create an asymmetrical arrangement, because in that case Creditor 2 can demand up-front
compensation for the impairment of her claim.
97. This is not to imply that asset shifting will not occur under asymmetry; the point is that it
will occur on a larger scale under symmetry.
98. Overinvestment costs are borne by the debtor's nonadjusting creditors, and by third parties
who are denied access to the capital that has been diverted to the wealth-destroying project.
A deadweight loss is borne by debtors who would be able to invest in profitable projects but
for the increase in their borrowing costs due to opportunism risk.
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The fact that asymmetrical arrangements are so prevalent is evidence that
asymmetry does provide the cheaper opportunism route for many debtors. As a
formal matter this seems unsurprising, as Debtor need only adopt an
asymmetrical arrangement to privilege Creditor i at the expense of Creditor 2.
To achieve the same wealth transfer through symmetry plus asset shifting,
Debtor would first have to adopt a partitioning arrangement, and then take the
additional step of assigning assets contributed by Creditor 2 to Asset 1. And
this second step may impose burdens the first does not. For example, debtors
are reluctant to "oversecure" secured loans, because by so doing they surrender
control over their estates and may have to forgo profitable investments. Section
II.F explores this feature of secured lending. For present purposes, the
important point is that the widespread use of asymmetry reveals that many
debtors see symmetry plus asset shifting as an inferior opportunism substitute.
As a consequence, legal reform that rendered asymmetrical arrangements
symmetrical as a default rule would curtail wealth transfers, thereby reducing
the loss of social wealth from opportunistic use of asset partitioning.99
II. SYMMETRY APPLIED: REFORMING THE SECURED LOAN
The conclusions reached in Part I have clear policy implications. Past
scholarship has sought to identify economic benefits of partitioning
arrangements that might counterbalance the social costs they impose by
inviting debtor opportunism. Part I has shown that, while these benefits might
justify asset partitioning generally, they cannot justify asymmetry in particular,
which relative to symmetry brings both lower benefits and more opportunism.
g9. There is another reason that reforming asymmetrical arrangements to be symmetrical
should creatJ wealth notwithstanding an increase in asset shifting: bankruptcy speed. To see
this, imagine an asymmetrical version of the simple model where Assets 1 and 2 are worth
$100 each and Creditors i and 2 are owed $ioo each. As I have noted, the arrangement's
asymmetry prevents a court from distributing value from Asset 2 before verifying the
amount of Creditor i's claim, which is inefficient whenever Creditor 2's claim can be verified
more quickly. Now, assume that the arrangement is reformed to be symmetrical, and
Debtor reacts by shifting $20 from Asset 2 to Asset 1. If Creditor 2's claim can be verified
more quickly, the change to symmetry permits the court to distribute value from Asset 2
before verifying Creditor i's claim. And if Creditor i's claim can be verified more quickly,
the asset shift means that there is more value in Asset i to distribute to him. In either case,
the switch from a balanced asymmetrical arrangement to an imbalanced symmetrical one
speeds the distribution of debtor assets. But because debtors might not fully capture such
efficiencies, they will discount them when choosing between opportunism mechanisms. For
this reason, it is likely that asset shifting is the lesser of the two social evils, even if we hold
constant the volume of opportunistic wealth transfers.
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If this is right, then the burden should be on those who would defend the
asymmetry of current arrangements to identify additional social benefits of
asset partitioning, and to show that asymmetry provides those benefits more
than symmetry does. Otherwise, lawmakers should consider reforming
asymmetrical arrangements to be symmetrical as a way of creating social
wealth.
Perhaps the most straightforward application of Part I's analysis is to the
American general partnership, which was symmetrical under the common
law's jingle rule for more than two centuries until amendments to the
Bankruptcy Code in 1978 rendered it asymmetrical.' 00 In previous work,
Hansmann, Kraakman and I defended the modern American rule for
partnerships on grounds that it is the default rule that most business owners
probably prefer.' By equating the interests of business owners with efficiency,
our argument overlooked the negative externalities that asymmetrical
partnerships generate by transferring wealth away from nonadjusting creditors
and slowing bankruptcy proceedings. We also did not recognize how the
American rule undermines appraisal efficiencies and shifts the impact of
misconduct by partnership agents onto personal creditors, a perverse result
given that partnership creditors have (by definition) transacted with
partnership agents and therefore will naturally be in a better position to
monitor them. Our previous arguments notwithstanding, the analysis in Part I
suggests that America's abandonment of the jingle rule was a mistake. 1°2
Rather, however, than exploring the social benefits of restoring the jingle
rule, or considering the implications of Part I for the (asymmetrical) guaranty
contract, Part II of this Article will focus on the secured loan. There are three
reasons the secured loan deserves particular attention. First, it is, next to the
business corporation, the most important partitioning arrangement in the
100. Why Congress overrode the jingle rule is a mystery. According to the Senate report, repeal
of the jingle rule "more closely tracks generally applicable partnership law." S. REP. No. 95-
989, at 95 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5881. But the opposite was the case,
as state law at the time reflected the Uniform Partnership Act, which codified the jingle rule.
UNIF. P'sHIP ACT § 40(h), 6 U.L.A. 901, 902 (1914). Nonetheless, to close the gap between
state and federal law created by the 1978 amendments, the 1997 revision to the UPA also
provides for asymmetry. UNIF. P'SHiPACT § 807(a) (amended 1997), 6 U.L.A. 206 (2ooi).
io. See sources cited supra note 28.In particular, we observed that business owners who wish to
give personal creditors first claim to personal assets can utilize limited liability entities such
as the corporation and LLC. We then argued that remaining owners presumably wish to
maximize business creditor recoveries from personal assets, and that the default rule should
cater to this preference in order to reduce transaction costs. See id.
ioa. The partnership continues to be governed by the jingle rule under English law. See
Hansmann et al., supra note i, at 1381.
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modern economy, with approximately 70% of the assets of bankrupt
commercial debtors pledged to secured creditors.' °3 Second, the secured loan
gives the secured creditor certain privileges- namely, protection against debt
dilution, and a right to retrieve debtor assets conveyed to third parties-that
are not provided by other asymmetrical arrangements, and that make the case
for symmetry even more compelling. And third, the secured loan is the
partitioning arrangement that has been the subject of the largest number of
reform proposals. Unlike symmetry, however, all previous proposals would
scale back the secured creditor's priority right in the secured assets, a change
that would undermine appraisal and bankruptcy-speed efficiencies while doing
nothing to improve monitoring incentives. Symmetry is novel because it alters
the secured creditor's deficiency claim rather than priority right, and for this
reason is the only reform that would curtail opportunism while at the same
time enhancing rather than undermining the secured loan's economic
efficiencies.
A. The Secured Loan Under Current Law
Secured lending is governed primarily by state law, and especially by
Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code. 1°4 To create a secured claim under
Article 9, a creditor signs a security agreement with a debtor and files notice of
the agreement in a public registry.' These steps give the secured creditor a
prior claim - commonly known as the "priority right" - to the assets the parties
have agreed to designate as secured,"°6 which is why the secured loan is a
partitioning arrangement. But the rights enjoyed by secured creditors go
103. See Warren & Westbrook, supra note 7, at 121o, 1222 n.91 (finding that the average
bankruptcy debtor has assets worth 73% of liabilities, and that 51% of liabilities are fully
covered by secured collateral, implying that 70% of assets are secured). The percentage of
secured assets is probably somewhat lower for debtors outside bankruptcy, as debtors are
more likely to issue secured debt when on the brink of insolvency. See Schwarcz, supra note
74, at 448.
104. Article 9 covers secured interests in most types of property other than real estate. U.C.C.
§ 9-109 (2005). Secured interests in land-that is, mortgages-are covered by statutes that
vary in detail from state to state. See CHALS DONAHUE, JR., THOMAS E. KAUPER & PETER
W. MARTIN, PROPERTY: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE CONCEPT AND THE INSTITUTION 590-605
(3d ed. 1993). But the principles of secured lending are the same in both contexts, with the
important exception that mortgages are more likely to be nonrecourse. See infra text
accompanying note 154.
105. U.C.C. §5 9-20 3(b), 9-310(a) (2005). Another option is for the secured creditor to take
possession of the secured assets, thereby providing "constructive" notice. Id. § 9-313.
1o6. Id. § 9-201.
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beyond those conferred by other partitioning arrangements in two important
ways. First, the secured creditor's priority right is dilution-proof, meaning that
no subsequent creditor can acquire an interest in the secured assets as senior as
his."° Second, a secured creditor enjoys a property right in the secured assets,
in the sense that he can seize those assets upon the debtor's default even if the
debtor has conveyed them to a third party. 8 In combination, these features of
the secured loan tighten the link between the secured creditor's fortunes and
the value of the secured assets. 109
A final right that Article 9 confers on secured creditors is a deficiency claim
to the debtor's unsecured assets.110 Article 9 does not, however, specify the
priority status of the deficiency claim relative to claims of unsecured creditors.
And neither do statutes enacted by several states that contemplate orderly
insolvency proceedings outside federal bankruptcy."' The question is explicitly
addressed only in the Bankruptcy Code, which requires that secured creditor
107. A creditor of an American general partnership, by contrast, can be diluted by subsequent
borrowing at the partnership level, even though his claim to partnership assets remains
prior to claims of partners' personal creditors. Also, an exception to the rule that a secured
claim is dilution-proof is the "purchase money security interest" (PMSI), which is a secured
claim to goods purchased with the proceeds of the loan the claim secures. Id. S 9-103. A
PMSI takes priority over previous secured interests issued by the debtor in the same assets,
which can occur if a previous creditor has been given security in after-acquired assets.
108. Id. § 9-315(a)(1). An exception applies to the debtor's sale of goods that the debtor sells in
the ordinary course of its business. Such goods pass to buyers free of security interests
created by the debtor. Id. § 9-320(a).
log. A third special right enjoyed by a secured creditor is the repossessory right, which permits
him to seize secured assets without first seeking court approval. Id. § 9 -6o 9 (b)(2). The
practical import of this right is limited, however, because secured creditors may not exercise
it if the debtor is in bankruptcy or if doing so would breach the peace. Id.; see also Douglas
G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Private Debt and the Missing Lever of Corporate Governance,
154 U. PA. L. REv. 1209, 1229 (2006) (commenting on the limited practical significance of
the repossessory right).
11o. U.C.C. § 9 -61 5(d)(2). An exception applies to loans secured by various types of commercial
paper, which are made nonrecourse. Id. § 9-615(e).
imi. Several state statutes contemplate orderly liquidations in the form of assignments for the
benefit of creditors. See Benjamin Weintraub, Harris Levin & Eugene Sosnoff, Assignments
for the Benefit of Creditors and Competitive Systems for Liquidation of Insolvent Estates, 39
CORNELL L.Q_ 3, 14-15 (1953); John Hanna, Note, Contemporary Utility of General
Assignments, 35 VA. L. REV. 539 (1949). But even the most comprehensive state regimes do
not address the status of secured creditor deficiency claims, see, e.g., N.Y. DEBT. & CRED.
LAW § 12(1) (McKinney 2001 & Supp. 20o8), nor do state codes that prescribe a method for
corporate liquidations, see, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 281(a)(4) (2001) (requiring
liquidating corporations to pay creditor claims "according to their priority, and, among
claims of equal priority, ratably," but not specifying which claims are "equal").
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deficiency claims be paid pro rata with unsecured claims." 2 The secured loan's
asymmetry is therefore dictated by federal law. And as is described below, this
result is wasteful, because it causes the deficiency claim to undermine the
efficiencies that would otherwise be generated by the secured creditor's various
rights in the secured assets. In this way, the state and federal law of secured
lending work at cross-purposes, destroying social wealth.
B. The Secured Loan and Appraisal Costs
Several scholars have argued that the secured loan reduces appraisal costs.
For example, Richard Posner has suggested that the secured loan permits
unsecured creditors to economize on their appraisal efforts because "the pool of
unsecured creditors is smaller and the pool of assets available to satisfy the
unsecured creditors is also smaller.' '13 Cast in this way, Posner's argument
implies that unsecured creditors can disregard both the amount owed the
secured creditor and the value of the secured assets. But this is untrue: because
of the secured creditor's deficiency claim, a drop in the value of the secured
assets often will harm the unsecured creditors even more than it harms the
secured creditor. 114 More broadly, the secured loan's asymmetry causes the
value of the secured assets to affect unsecured creditor recoveries regardless of
the form the debtor's insolvency takes." 5 For this reason, the degree to which
the secured loan currently permits unsecured creditors to economize on their
appraisal efforts is slight at best.
The secured loan now provides somewhat greater appraisal economies to
the secured creditor, whose prior claim to the secured assets reduces his
exposure to the risk that the unsecured assets will depreciate. This benefit is
heightened by the secured creditor's property right in the secured assets, which
makes it more likely that those assets will be available if the debtor defaults.
These considerations suggest that a debtor can reduce overall appraisal costs by
giving a creditor a secured claim to those assets the creditor can appraise more
cheaply than other creditors can. But the secured loan's asymmetry then works
against this potential source of efficiency, because it makes the value of the
unsecured assets an important component of the secured creditor's overall risk
11. ii U.S.C. §§ 5o6(a), 726(a)-(b) (2000).
113. RjICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 428 ( 7 th ed. 2007); see also Jackson &
Kronman, supra note 4, at ii6o-6i (arguing that the secured loan reduces "informational"
costs).
114. See supra Figure 1.
115. See supra Section I.B.
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exposure. Put another way, a debtor's cost of borrowing on an unsecured basis
will be lower if the debtor's secured creditors agree to subordinate or waive
their deficiency claims, and therefore the debtor will make the secured creditors
pay - typically in the form of an interest rate discount - for secured claims that
are asymmetrical rather than symmetrical. But the secured creditors cannot
determine how large a discount to provide without taking some account of the
value of the unsecured assets.
Symmetry would enable both secured and unsecured creditors to incur
lower appraisal costs than they do now. If the secured creditor's deficiency
claim were subordinated, the value of the unsecured assets would affect the
secured creditor's recovery only if the unsecured assets were above water even
though the debtor was insolvent. And this would be rare, because dilution-
causing creditors such as tort claimants are automatically treated as unsecured.
Moreover, even if the secured creditor did recover from the unsecured assets,
his share would be smaller under symmetry than under asymmetry. Symmetry
therefore would further reduce the need for a secured creditor to valuate the
unsecured assets when appraising a debtor's estate. And unsecured creditors
similarly could be less concerned with the value of the secured assets, because
under symmetry the secured creditor's deficiency claim could not affect their
recoveries.
The dilution-proof nature of a secured claim also decreases the secured
creditor's need to pay attention to the risk that the debtor will erode the net
value of its estate by incurring subsequent liabilities."6 As a matter of
efficiency, however, this is a mixed blessing. One of the primary ways a debtor
can dilute its estate is by incurring tort liability. For this reason, contract
creditors will normally charge lower interest rates if the debtor reduces its tort
risk by, for example, avoiding ultrahazardous activity or investing in safety
equipment. 17 To the extent that tort liability results from socially wasteful
conduct, this connection between the debtor's tort risk and borrowing costs is
efficient. But secured lending frays this tie by causing a debtor's contract
creditors to recover more, and tort claimants less, than they would if all claims
were unsecured. Symmetry would increase tort recoveries by privileging tort
claimants over the secured creditor in the division of the unsecured assets. This
might make the secured creditor even less concerned with tort risk, because it
would reduce his likelihood of recovering from the unsecured assets in any
event. But the debtor's contract creditors as a whole would be more worried
about tort liability because the increase in tort claimant recoveries would come
ii6. See Buckley, supra note 26, at 1424-25; Schwartz, supra note 36, at 244.
117. See Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 2, at 898-99; LoPucki, supra note 86, at 1898-99.
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at their expense. In this way, symmetry would partly restore the salutary link
between tort risk and borrowing costs."8
C. The Secured Loan and Creditor Monitoring
Although several scholars have argued that the secured loan promotes
creditor monitoring efficiencies, they have disagreed about which creditors it
encourages to monitor. Thomas Jackson and Anthony Kronman began the
debate by observing that a secured loan shifts risk onto the unsecured
creditors, and then concluding from this observation that debtors issue security
in order to increase the unsecured creditors' incentive to monitor.1 9 Alan
Schwartz criticized the Jackson-Kronman theory for contradicting practice: the
theory predicts that debtors would deny security to those creditors who can
monitor most cheaply, but debtors in fact tend to give security to sophisticated
creditors, such as banks, who presumably are talented monitors. 2 ° In response
to Schwartz's objection, Saul Levmore theorized that a secured loan instead
encourages the secured creditor to monitor. Levmore argued that creditors will
naturally try to free-ride on the monitoring efforts of others, but that a creditor
will not mind monitoring on behalf of all creditors as long as he receives the
priority right as compensation. 2'
In the language of this Article, the Jackson-Kronman theory emphasizes the
insulating effect of the secured creditor's deficiency claim, and the Levmore
theory emphasizes the focusing effect of the priority right. And, because it is
asymmetrical, the secured loan has both effects. The problem is that the two
effects work at cross-purposes, with each undercutting the monitoring
incentives the other might create. This is especially true with respect to the
incentives of the secured creditor. As the discussion of monitoring in Part I
suggests, the secured loan's asymmetry makes the secured creditor less likely to
118. A possible objection is that unsecured contract creditors are less sophisticated than most
secured creditors, see Schwartz, supra note 35, at 11 n.28, and therefore are less likely to
impute tort risk into the interest rate they demand. But it should be kept in mind that the tie
between borrowing costs and tort risk does not require that unsecured contract creditors be
adjusting in the sense that they monitor to prevent tort liability after they extend credit. The
only requirement is that they factor some estimation of the debtor's likely tort liability into
their initial terms of lending.
119. Jackson & Kronman, supra note 4, at 1143; accord Barry E. Adler, An Equity-Agency Solution to
the Bankruptcy-Priority Puzzle, 22 J. LEGAL STUD. 73, 89 (1993) (arguing that debtors use
security to shift risk onto unsecured creditors and thus to encourage them to monitor).
120. See Schwartz, supra note 35, at ii n.28.
121. Levmore, supra note 33, at 56-57.
118:8o6 2009
HeinOnline  -- 118 Yale L. J.  850 2008-2009
THE CASE FOR SYMMETRY IN CREDITORS' RIGHTS
monitor either the secured assets or the unsecured assets than he would be
under the pro rata rule. The Levmore theory therefore appears incorrect, as
debtors would not try to reward a creditor for monitoring by giving the
creditor a type of claim that discourages it.1
22
The fact that the secured loan's asymmetry discourages the secured creditor
from monitoring the secured assets in particular is perverse, for several reasons.
First, the secured creditor is likely to be the creditor who can appraise the
secured assets most cheaply, which implies that he also would be best able to
monitor them for depreciation. Second, the dilution-proof nature of the
priority right minimizes the risk that the secured creditor will have to share the
secured assets with other creditors in a liquidation proceeding.'23 This means
that the secured loan is unique among partitioning arrangements in its
potential to overcome the collective action problem created by the pro rata rule.
And third, the secured creditor's property right in the secured assets prevents
third parties from expropriating the benefits of efforts by the secured creditor
to protect those assets' value. In combination, these common law rights ensure
both that the secured creditor is the low-cost monitor of the secured assets and
that he in many instances would be able to keep all of the benefits of
monitoring those assets for himself. But the secured loan's asymmetry then
squanders the opportunity for optimal monitoring incentives, because it
insulates the secured creditor from a drop in the secured assets' value.
On the other hand, the secured loan's asymmetry might encourage
monitoring by the unsecured creditors, an observation that lends support to
the Jackson-Kronman theory. But the support is weak at best. Relative to the
pro rata rule, the secured loan's asymmetry only moderately increases the
degree to which the unsecured creditors capture the benefits of monitoring the
unsecured assets. And it likely discourages them from monitoring the secured
assets, because their payoff from doing so is highly sensitive to the secured
assets' precise value, and it is the secured creditor who typically will be able to
assess that value most cheaply.
122. Accord Buckley, supra note 26, at 1443 (noting that "secured parties do not in fact appear to
do much actual monitoring of collateral value"). Another problem with Levmore's theory is
that secured creditors do not make promises to monitor in the contracts they sign with
debtors. The promises might be implied, but it is hard to believe that a debtor would
transfer something as valuable as a security interest in exchange for a tacit and legally
unenforceable promise, or that unsecured creditors would forgo efforts to protect
themselves in reliance on such a promise.
123. The risk is not zero because of the possibility that the secured creditor will be oversecured
even if the debtor falls bankrupt, in which case the excess value of the secured assets will go
to the unsecured creditors.
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The secured loan would, however, encourage efficient monitoring by
secured and unsecured creditors alike if it were reformed to be symmetrical. If
the secured creditor's deficiency claim were subordinated, the insulating effect
would recede, leaving the focusing effect to predominate. This would give the
secured creditor greater incentive to protect the secured assets, thereby
reinforcing rather than undermining the monitoring incentives created by the
secured creditor's various common law rights. And symmetry would also
encourage efficient monitoring by the unsecured creditors, because it would
reduce the overlap between the secured creditor's claim and their own claims,
thereby permitting them to keep more of the benefits of monitoring the
unsecured assets for themselves.' 4
In discussing his monitoring theory, Levmore raised but then rejected the
possibility that subordinating or eliminating the secured creditor's deficiency
claim would encourage the secured creditor to monitor. Secured creditors
would respond to such a change by charging higher interest rates, 2 ' and
Levmore believed that this increase in the secured creditors' compensation for
risk would undermine their incentive to guard against debtor misconduct.126
Levmore in this analysis seems to have had in mind the moral hazard created
by an insurance policy, which reduces a policyholder's incentive to prevent a
loss because it pays the policyholder if the loss occurs. But ex ante
compensation for risk, as contrasted with ex post compensation for loss, creates
no such hazard. Thus, workers in dangerous occupations receive a risk
premium in their wages, but this premium will not make the workers careless
on the job. To the contrary, they will be more careful because their opportunity
cost of injury is greater. In the same way, a higher interest rate will make a
secured creditor more rather than less likely to monitor because he will be
124. This observation necessarily applies only to voluntary unsecured creditors. No partitioning
arrangement can encourage monitoring by involuntary creditors such as certain tort
claimants. Also, symmetry would increase the incentive for unsecured contract creditors to
monitor to prevent debt dilution. This effect may be slight, however, due to the fact that
creditors are less likely to monitor to prevent debt dilution than asset depletion even under
symmetry. See supra Subsection I.C.6.
125. Levmore, supra note 33, at 57 ("If the secured creditor in bankruptcy has recourse only to the
collateralized asset, then the secured creditor will be unlikely to agree to an interest rate
lower than that agreed to by unsecured creditors .... "). Of course it is this lower interest
rate, rather than a promise to monitor, that the debtor receives from the secured creditor in
exchange for the grant of security.
126. Id. ("[T]he secured creditor's incentive to monitor derives solely from the premium it has
paid in the form of agreeing to lend at a lower interest rate .... ").
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owed more when the debtor defaults and therefore will have more to lose from
the debtor's misconduct.
D. The Secured Loan and Bankruptcy Speed
The secured loan's asymmetry slows liquidation proceedings by preventing
a court from distributing unsecured assets without first determining the
amount of each secured creditor's deficiency claim, which requires verification
of secured creditor proofs of claim and valuation of the secured assets. 1 7
Symmetry would remove this impediment to distribution of the unsecured
assets.
Symmetry would also speed up bankruptcy proceedings by cutting down
on litigation over the enforceability of secured claims. The absolute advantage
that secured creditors now enjoy means that unsecured creditors can always
increase their recoveries by proving a violation of the numerous technical
requirements for "perfecting" a secured lien under state law. S For this reason,
legal challenges to the enforceability of secured loans are a staple of bankruptcy
proceedings. 29 Symmetry would reduce the incentive for unsecured creditors
to contest secured claims, and indeed would eliminate it in situations where the
secured assets had dropped further underwater than the unsecured assets had.
In this way, symmetry would not only expedite distribution of secured assets,
but also save on legal fees and free up judicial resources.
E. The Secured Loan's Asymmetry as a Source of Opportunism
Like other asymmetrical arrangements, the secured loan invites debtor
opportunism by ensuring that one creditor will recover a higher percentage on
his claim than others will if the debtor falls bankrupt. It is this feature of the
secured loan, rather than purported monitoring efficiencies, that explains why
127. 11 U.S.C. § 5o6(a)(i) (2000) (providing that a secured creditor's claim is unsecured to the
extent of any deficiency in the secured assets); id. § 726(b) (providing for payment of
unsecured claims on a pro rata basis).
128. See U.C.C. § 9-301(1) (2005) (providing that an unperfected security interest is invalid as
against a creditor with a judicial lien); id. §§ 9-310 to -316 (2005) (describing the
requirements for perfecting a security interest).
129. See, e.g., Pearson v. Salina Coffee House, Inc., 831 F.2d 1531 (ioth Cir. 1987) (involving a
financing statement listing the debtor's trade name rather than its legal name); In re
Bollinger Corp., 614 F.2d 924 (3d Cir. 198o) (involving an unsigned security agreement); In
re Flagstaff Foodservice Corp., 16 B.R. 132 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1981) (involving an alleged
failure of a town clerk to index a properly submitted financing statement).
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debtors typically give security to sophisticated lenders such as banks. 3°
Sophisticated creditors will be best able to valuate the expected wealth transfer
produced by asymmetry, and therefore will be at an advantage when bidding
for it. And the pursuit of the wealth transfer generates a host of social costs. For
example, the interest rate discount the secured creditor gives in exchange for
the transfer will encourage overinvestment. And the availability of secured
lending will force creditors to incur costs to protect themselves against
subordination, which in turn will cause a deadweight loss by raising borrowing
costs for those debtors who wish to borrow solely on an unsecured basis.
Alternatively, creditors will demand security to ensure that they are not
themselves subordinated, thereby incurring transaction costs that serve no
positive social purpose.
Another way to understand the expected wealth transfer produced by the
secured loan is to observe that the arrangement's asymmetry makes the secured
creditor's returns less volatile, and the unsecured creditors' returns more
volatile, than they would be under either symmetry or the pro rata rule. In
theory, such a transfer of risk would create wealth if secured creditors were
relatively risk-averse. But the opposite in fact tends to be the case, as the large
commercial lenders who usually obtain security are better able to diversify their
investment risk than are many unsecured creditors, such as trade creditors and
tort claimants. The secured loan's asymmetry therefore shifts risk in the wrong
direction, making risk misallocation another social cost of the arrangement.'31
Symmetry would reduce each of these social costs of secured lending.
Subordination of the secured creditor's deficiency claim would increase
recoveries for nonadjusting creditors, thereby reducing the amount of the
expected wealth transfer. And smaller wealth transfers, in turn, would mean a
reduction in the interest rate distortions that cause overinvestment'32 and less
need for creditors to incur costs to protect themselves. To be sure, a
130. See supra note 12o and accompanying text.
131. See Hansmann et al., supra note i, at 1353 (identifying de-diversification of creditor claims as
a social cost of entity shielding).
132. Consistent with this analysis, George Triantis has argued that a purchase money security
interest (PMSI) will not cause overinvestment in a situation where a debtor's prior creditors
"hold security interests in all assets ... and [a subsequent] pmsi holder is subordinate with
respect to all assets other than its collateral." George G. Triantis, Financial Slack Policy and
the Law of Secured Transactions, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 35, 50 (2000). The scenario Triantis
describes reflects symmetry, because each creditor enjoys a prior claim to a distinct debtor
asset pool. But overinvestment will still occur because the fact that all contract creditors are
secured means that none will impute the debtor's tort risk into the interest rate they
demand.
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symmetrical secured loan would still be dilution-proof, and so the secured
creditor would retain a distributional advantage. But the advantage would no
longer be absolute, as subordination of the deficiency claim would make it
possible for the unsecured creditors to recover a higher percentage on their
claims than the secured creditor does.
Although several other scholars have argued that the secured loan produces
an uncompensated wealth transfer, 3' the point is not universally accepted. In
particular, Steven Schwarcz has argued that unsecured creditors are not
prejudiced if the secured creditor takes security in nothing more than the assets
purchased with the proceeds of the secured loan.3 4 Schwarcz reasons that
unsecured creditors are protected in that case because the debtor's estate has
received assets whose value offsets the liability created by the secured claim.
But Schwarcz ignores the effect of the secured creditor's deficiency claim,
which in his scenario would dilute the unsecured claims in bankruptcy
whenever the secured assets had dropped in value,13 which of course will be
likely if bankruptcy has occurred." 6 Contrary to Schwarcz's argument, an
asymmetrical secured loan prejudices unsecured creditors even if the secured
creditor takes security in only a fraction of the loan proceeds - that is, even if he
starts out undersecured. Only if it were symmetrical would the arrangement
Schwarcz describes be distributionally neutral.
F. Oversecurity and Blanket Liens
As the preceding discussion implies, asymmetry is not the only feature of
the secured loan that invites opportunism. Debtors currently enjoy wide
latitude to oversecure a loan-that is, to grant security in assets worth more
than the secured creditor's claim. Like asymmetry, oversecurity transfers
wealth away from nonadjusting creditors, and for this reason produces the
same opportunism costs: overinvestment, defensive costs incurred by creditors
133. For a partial list of such scholars and a review of their reform proposals, see infra Section
II.H.
134. Schwarcz, supra note 74, at 435.
135. The secured assets might also appreciate, but in that case insolvency is unlikely, and-as
Schwarcz acknowledges- the benefit of the appreciation accrues to the debtor rather than
the unsecured creditors. Id. at 44o.
136. Indeed, Schwarcz employs a model which assumes that debtor assets lose 50% of their value
when the debtor is liquidated. Id. at 441.
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to protect against subordination,137 and a possible deadweight loss in the credit
market. In addition, oversecurity can undermine appraisal and monitoring
efficiencies by causing an imbalance in the value of secured and unsecured
assets relative to creditor claims.'
38
Although debtors regularly oversecure loans currently, they would be more
likely to do so if the secured loan were reformed to be symmetrical. This is
because subordination of their deficiency claims would cause secured creditors
to offer larger inducements for protection against a shortfall in the secured
assets. But would oversecurity increase on a scale that fully nullified
symmetry's social benefits?
In this section, I address this question in two ways. First, I consider the
costs to debtors of oversecurity; second, I consider whether oversecurity might
provide offsetting efficiencies, in particular when it takes the form of a blanket
lien on a debtor's entire estate.
1. Oversecurity Under Symmetry
There are at least two reasons to conclude that parties would not respond
to symmetry by expanding the scope of secured claims on a scale that fully
restored the secured creditors' distributional advantage. The first is that parties
are circumscribed in their ability to oversecure one of the most common types
of secured loan - the purchase money security interest (PMSI) - because it by
definition extends only to assets purchased with the loan proceeds. 39 Although
a secured creditor could convert a PMSI to a regular secured loan, this would
forfeit the special advantages that a PMSI holder enjoys against the debtor's
other secured creditors, which are the PMSI's primary appeal.14°
The second, and likely more important, reason that an increase in
oversecurity would not neutralize the full benefits of symmetry is that
oversecurity imposes higher costs on debtors that asymmetry does per dollar
transferred opportunistically. In particular, secured assets are subject to the
secured creditor's property right, which permits the secured creditor to seize
those assets upon the debtor's default even if they have been conveyed to third
137. Asset shifting in the opposite direction-for the benefit of unsecured creditors-is more
difficult because a debtor cannot formally reduce the scope of a secured lien without the
secured creditor's consent.
138. See supra Section I.F.
139. U.C.C. § 9-103 (2005).
140. See supra note 107.
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parties.' 41 As a consequence, a debtor can sell secured assets to third parties
only at a deep discount, which fetters the debtor's discretion to manage its own
affairs. The secured creditor can waive his property right by consenting to a
sale, but he often will be disinclined to do so because creditors and debtors are
structurally at odds in their preference for risk. A secured creditor will be
especially likely to veto an asset sale whenever the debtor is seeking to raise
funds to invest in a risky project, or-in the case of a corporate debtor-to
distribute cash to shareholders. This veto may pay social dividends to the
extent that the secured creditor uses it to block overinvestment. 142 As Robert
Scott and others have observed, however, the fact that secured creditors are
owed fixed amounts - and hence do not share fully in upside returns - will also
cause them to veto some risky projects that are socially worthwhile.1 43
Empirical research by Ronald Mann suggests that the burden to debtors of the
property right explains why many do not secure all of their assets even though
they could enrich themselves at the expense of nonadjusting creditors by doing
so) 44 By contrast, secured creditors enjoy no property right in unsecured
assets, even though they can reach those assets through their deficiency claim.
A debtor therefore would rather transfer wealth to a secured creditor by
enhancing the creditor's claim to the unsecured assets (which is what
asymmetry accomplishes) than by granting the creditor a secured interest in
more of the debtor's estate.
These observations suggest that most debtors would be unable or
unwilling to substitute wealth transfers via oversecurity for those via
asymmetry on a dollar-for-dollar basis. Therefore, if secured loans were
reformed to be symmetrical, net wealth transfers away from nonadjusting
creditors would fall. And smaller wealth transfers would mean lower social
costs from overinvestment, creditor defensive efforts, and deadweight loss in
the credit market.
The fact that most debtors consider oversecurity to be inferior to
asymmetry as a wealth-transfer mechanism does not mean that oversecurity is
141. An exception sometimes applies to goods sold by the debtor in the ordinary course of
business. See supra note 1o8.
142. Accord Adler, supra note i 19, at 79 (observing that the secured creditor's property right in
the secured assets deters asset substitution).
143. Robert E. Scott, A Relational Theoty of Secured Financing, 86 CoLUM. L. REv. 901, 929
(1986); see also Ronald J. Mann, Explaining the Pattern of Secured Credit, 11o HARv. L. REv.
625, 664 & n.153 (1997) (observing that creditors may discourage debtors from pursuing
"value-increasing risky transactions").
144. Mann, supra note 143, at 673.
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nothing for lawmakers to worry about. To the contrary, the capacity for
oversecurity to generate the full spectrum of opportunism costs raises the
question why debtors enjoy such broad powers to engage in it. Interestingly,
courts at one time used fraudulent conveyance law to police oversecurity, 14s but
they stopped doing so after the drafters of the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer
Act (UFTA) argued in a comment that oversecurity is unproblematic because a
secured creditor can never recover more than the amount of his claim.46 This
argument is specious: fraudulent conveyance law is supposed to protect
unsecured creditors, and expanding the scope of a secured claim decreases their
expected recoveries whenever there is a risk that the debtor will fall insolvent,
which of course is the only time that a creditor has reason to seek more security
in the first place.
Are there better arguments for the law's current hands-off approach to
oversecurity? Although scholars not have addressed this question directly, a
few have claimed social benefits for the "blanket lien," which is a secured claim
that extends to all of a debtor's estate. Strictly speaking, a blanket lien does not
create asset partitioning, because the secured creditor enjoys an
undifferentiated prior claim to all debtor assets. It therefore will be necessary to
analyze blanket liens using a modified version of the simple model before
drawing conclusions about their social utility.
2. A (Brief) Economic Analysis of the Blanket Lien
In a blanket lien there are no asset pools: Creditor 1 enjoys a prior claim to
all of Debtor's assets, and Creditor 2 takes whatever is left after Creditor 1 has
been paid in full. The status of Creditor i's deficiency claim is thus irrelevant,
which means that reforming the secured loan to be symmetrical would have no
impact on blanket liens (except to make them more common by raising
demand for oversecurity). One clear consequence of the lack of asset
partitioning is that the expected wealth transfer away from Creditor 2 is
maximized: as Debtor's estate drops in value, Creditor 2's recovery shrinks to
zero before Creditor i's decreases at all. Blanket liens therefore will generate
each of the various costs of debtor opportunism to a greater degree than will a
lending arrangement that features distinct asset pools.
145. See, e.g., Am. Fid. Co. v. Harney, 217 N.E.2d 905, 911 (Mass. 1966).
146. UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT § 3 cmt. 3, 7A U.L.A. 651 (1985); see also Richard J.
Sabella, When Enough Is Too Much: Overcollateralization as a Fraudulent Conveyance, 9
CADOZO L. REV. 773, 777-78 (1987) (summarizing the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act
position).
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In terms of potentially offsetting efficiencies, the lack of asset partitioning
means that a blanket lien does not reward creditors for focusing on particular
assets as a way of economizing on appraisal efforts. On this efficiency metric,
then, the blanket lien is no improvement on the pro rata rule. Somewhat
contrary to this conclusion, Alan Schwartz has argued that a default rule which
automatically gave a debtor's first major lender a blanket lien to all current and
after-acquired assets might provide an efficient form of protection against debt
dilution.' 47 However, as was noted previously, dilution-proof claims for
contract creditors are problematic because they weaken the link between tort
risk and borrowing costs.' 4 8 And, as George Triantis has observed, Schwartz's
proposed rule would discourage debtors from subsequently investing in low-
risk, socially valuable projects, because the rule would give the prior lender a
windfall share in those projects' returns.' 49 Finally, Schwartz does not explain
why a prior claim limited to the lender's loan proceeds plus the assets
purchased with the debtor's equity investment would not fully protect against
debt dilution, making unnecessary a blanket lien that also covers assets
purchased with funding from subsequent lenders.'
With respect to monitoring efficiencies, a blanket lien is in effect the
opposite of symmetry. Thus, while a switch from asymmetry to symmetry
would weaken the insulation effect and strengthen the focusing effect, a
blanket lien achieves the converse: neither creditor's interest is focused on any
particular asset, and Creditor i is fully insulated from asset depletion as long as
remaining assets are sufficient to cover his claim. This shift of depletion risk
onto Creditor 2 will cause her to capture more of the benefits of her own
monitoring efforts, which in theory would mitigate the collective action
147. Schwartz, supra note 36, at 218-19. Along similar lines, Douglas Baird and Robert
Rasmussen have argued that a blanket lien, by making it costly for a debtor to borrow
elsewhere, enables the debtor to bind itself to the supervision of the lienholder. Baird &
Rasmussen, supra note 1O9, at 1230. But the authors do not explain why a secured claim
limited to the assets purchased with the lender's loan proceeds, plus a covenant forbidding
additional borrowing, would not achieve the same result. To be sure, loan covenants require
monitoring to be effective, but active monitoring by the lender is already central to the
supervision story that Baird and Rasmussen tell. Id.
148. See supra Section II.B.
149. Triantis, supra note 132, at 47.
150. Indeed, Schwartz effectively concedes that a blanket lien is unnecessary when he
acknowledges that a prior lender is not diluted by a subsequent PMSI as long as the PMSL
holder does not end up undersecured. Schwartz, supra note 36, at 242. In focusing on the
possibility of undersecurity, Schwartz is evidently concerned about the PMSI holder's
deficiency claim, which could dilute the prior lender if the lender were unsecured. Accord
Triantis, supra note 132, at So.
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problem. A few scholars have made the related argument that blanket liens
create value by enabling parties to build a hierarchy of secured claims, with the
junior positions assigned to secured creditors who-because of monitoring
skills or otherwise-are the most efficient risk bearers."5 ' But it must be
remembered that pinned underneath such a claim stack always will be the
unsecured creditors, many of whom will be nonadjusting. Therefore, a blanket
lien - either in isolation or as part of a hierarchy of secured claims - ultimately
shifts the impact of debtor misconduct onto the creditors who are least able to
monitor to prevent it. In this way, a blanket lien like asymmetry will
undermine monitoring incentives relative to the pro rata rule.'52
Finally, a blanket lien is comparable to asymmetry in terms of bankruptcy
speed: it requires a court to verify Creditor i's claim before distributing any
debtor assets, which is an improvement over the pro rata rule only when
Creditor i's claim can be verified more quickly than can Creditor 2's claim.
Although a court typically should be able to verify a single secured claim more
quickly than a multitude of unsecured claims, the extreme distributional
advantage enjoyed by a blanket lienholder makes litigation over enforceability
highly likely. A blanket lien therefore may only moderately expedite a
bankruptcy proceeding relative to the pro rata rule.'
In combination, these observations suggest that a blanket lien generates
higher social costs than asymmetry does while being no better in terms of
potential social benefits. Previous scholarly defenses of the blanket lien
therefore do not seem to justify the law's lax approach to oversecurity - nor, as
151. See, e.g., James J. White, Efficiency Justifications for Personal Property Security, 37 VAND. L.
REV. 473, 491 (1984) ("[I]t is probably efficient to give security to those creditors displaying
the greatest risk aversion.").
152. If blanket liens were prohibited, debtors could still prioritize claims through devices such as
subordination agreements and preferred stock in lieu of debt, which are more efficient
because they subordinate consensually and hence do not generate opportunism costs.
153. Another potential social benefit of the blanket lien has been suggested by Steven Schwarcz.
Distressed debtors often use blanket liens to raise capital, and Schwarcz argues that this
practice can benefit nonadjusting creditors if the debtor's business is fundamentally sound
but is in distress due to a lack of liquidity. Schwarcz, supra note 74, at 442. Schwarcz
acknowledges that the new lenders in such situations refuse to extend credit except in
exchange for a blanket lien, id. at 449, but he does not acknowledge how this fact is in
tension with his theory. A debtor whose business is fundamentally sound is able to earn
returns on invested capital high enough to service a competitive interest rate. Therefore,
even if such a debtor were illiquid, it would be able to offer an interest rate high enough to
induce long-term creditors to lend either unsecured or with security limited to assets
purchased with the loan proceeds. By contrast, a debtor who cannot undertake socially
worthwhile projects must subsidize its borrowing by transferring wealth from nonadjusting
creditors to the lender. And a blanket lien provides that subsidy, writ large.
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noted previously, does the argument offered by the drafters of the UFTA. The
implication is that courts again should consider policing oversecurity as a way
of increasing the efficiency of secured lending. Effective rules against
oversecurity would reinforce the social benefits of symmetry, even while they
are not needed for symmetry to be worthwhile.
G. A Proposal for Symmetrical Secured Loans
To translate symmetry into a specific proposal, a threshold question must
be addressed. To this point I have spoken of symmetry in terms of
subordinating the secured creditor's deficiency claim. But symmetry also
would be achieved by eliminating the deficiency claim entirely. That alternative
has more precedent as a matter of practice, as debtors frequently issue a
"nonrecourse" loan, which gives the secured creditor a prior claim to the
secured assets but no deficiency claim to the debtor's remaining estate.'54
Although nonrecourse lending provides the general efficiency benefits of
symmetry, it also produces moral hazard, because without a deficiency claim
the debtor lacks incentive to maintain the value of the secured assets when they
are underwater but the debtor is nonetheless solvent.' This problem explains
why creditors tend to accept nonrecourse claims against assets whose value the
debtor is unlikely or unable to impair, such as real estate."s6 Most commercial
assets are not similarly resistant to debtor misconduct. On the theory that
transaction costs are minimized if the rule preferred by the majority is the
default rule,' reform of the secured loan should avoid the moral hazard
problem by subordinating rather than eliminating the deficiency claim."8
Those who prefer a nonrecourse arrangement could continue to contract for
one directly.
Under federal law, subordination of the deficiency claim would require
changes to two sections of the Bankruptcy Code. The first is section 506, which
154. See BLACK'S LAW DicTIoNARY 1083 (8th ed. 2004) (defining "nonrecourse").
155. See Gregory M. Stein, The Scope of the Borrower's Liability in a Nonrecourse Real Estate Loan,
55 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1207, 1239 (1998). Courts sometimes use the doctrine of waste to
punish debtors who fail to maintain secured real estate assets. Id. at 1224-28.
156. Id. at 1209-10.
157. POSNER, supra note 113, at 96.
158. As I noted in my discussion of the American general partnership, a majoritarian default rule
that generates negative externalities can be inefficient. See supra text accompanying note ioi.
But neither type of symmetrical secured loan would generate meaningful negative
externalities.
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defines the nonsecured portion of a secured creditor's claim as an "unsecured
claim."'' 9 Under my proposal, this instead would be defined as a "secured
creditor deficiency claim." The second is section 726, which requires payment
of most unsecured claims on a pro rata basis. 6° Under my proposal, this
section would provide for payment of secured creditor deficiency claims after
payment of general unsecured claims. 6 ' These amendments would make
secured loans symmetrical in both liquidations and reorganizations.162 And
they would preserve the right recognized in the Bankruptcy Code for parties to
contract around priority rules as long as all negatively affected creditors
consent.163 Symmetry therefore would be a default rule in both directions:
secured creditors could waive their deficiency claims altogether, or they could
contract directly with unsecured creditors for asymmetry. It is unclear how
often parties would choose the second option given that the primary current
motive for the use of asymmetry is opportunism. Nevertheless, the lack of an
opportunism risk makes consensual asymmetry unproblematic. In essence,
consensual asymmetry would be a side agreement between the secured creditor
and an unsecured creditor to divide the unsecured creditor's share of the
debtor's estate. 64
159. 11 U.S.C. § 5o6(a)(1) (2000).
16o. Id. § 726(a)-(b).
16l. Section 726(a) provides for six tiers of nonsecured claims, to be paid in this order:
(i) privileged unsecured claims, such as tax and employee salary claims; (2) general
unsecured claims filed on time; (3) general unsecured claims filed late; (4) claims for
punitive damages or fines that do not compensate the creditor for monetary losses;
(5) interest on all claims; and (6) the debtor's equity claim. Id. § 726(a). My proposal would
insert between the third and fourth tiers a new category for "payment of any allowed
secured creditor deficiency claim." Situating deficiency claims at this level would achieve
symmetry without upsetting Congress's objectives of subordinating punitive damages
claims, and of paying the face amounts of all claims before paying interest on any.
16z. Although section 726 formally applies only to Chapter 7 liquidations, Chapter 11 ties creditor
voting rights in the approval of reorganization plans to the Chapter 7 priority schedule. Id.
§1129(a)(7)(A)(ii).
163. Id. § 5io(a) (providing for enforcement of subordination agreements).
164. A potential concern with my proposal is that secured creditors would circumvent it by
encouraging debtors to liquidate outside the bankruptcy system. As noted previously, state
law is mostly silent on the priority status of secured creditor deficiency claims, see supra note
iii, creating an ambiguity that secured creditors might petition state courts to resolve to
their advantage. Were this to occur on a large scale, parallel state-level reform might be
advisable. But there is reason to doubt that strategic circumvention would be a serious
problem. Although only a small fraction of defaulting debtors pass through federal
bankruptcy, the percentage jumps when the debtor has secured creditors. See Edward R.
Morrison, Bargaining Around Bankruptcy: Small Business Workouts and State Law 4-5 (Ctr. for
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H. Symmetry Versus Previous Reform Proposals
Although symmetry is only the latest in a long line of reform proposals for
the secured loan, it differs from its predecessors in one key respect: all previous
proposals would scale back the secured creditor's priority right. For this reason,
previous proposals demand a tradeoff: they would increase recoveries for
nonadjusting creditors, but at the expense of social benefits that secured loans
now provide in terms of appraisal economies and bankruptcy speed. And by
leaving untouched the secured creditor's deficiency claim, these proposals
would do nothing to correct how the secured loan now discourages efficient
monitoring.
The proposal that seems to have won the largest number of academic
supporters is a "superpriority" rule that would give tort creditors first claim to
all debtor assets, including those pledged to secured creditors. 6 ' The goal
would be to strengthen the link between a debtor's tort risk and borrowing
costs. And superpriority undoubtedly would have this effect: while tort
creditors of a bankrupt debtor now typically recover a small percentage on their
claims,' 66 superpriority would vault them to the top of the claims queue, often
Law & Econ. Studies, Columbia Law Sch., Working Paper No. 320, 20o8), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract=o65543. Reform at the federal level would further boost this
percentage by increasing the incentive for unsecured creditors to exercise their option to file
a bankruptcy petition. See 11 U.S.C. § 3o3(b)(i) (permitting involuntary petitions signed by
at least three unsecured creditors whose claims satisfy an amount-in-controversy
requirement). Finally, because creditors typically do not know prospectively whether a
debtor will enter bankruptcy, the shadow of symmetry at the federal level will change
appraisal and monitoring efforts even for those creditors whose debtors ultimately undergo
liquidation outside bankruptcy. Cf. Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy Case
for the Priority of Secured Claims in Bankruptcy: Further Thoughts and a Reply to Critics, 82
CORNELL L. REV. 1279, 1342 (1997) (making the same argument in favor of the authors'
bankruptcy-only "partial priority" proposal).
165. David W. Leebron, Limited Liability, Tort Victims, and Creditors, 91 COLUM. L. REv. 1565,
1643-46 (1991); LoPucki, supra note 86, at 1907-16; Note, Switching Priorities: Elevating the
Status of Tort Claims in Bankruptcy in Pursuit of Optimal Deterrence, 116 HARv. L. REV. 2541
(2003).
166. As noted above, supra note 103, Warren and Westbrook's study found that the average
bankruptcy debtor has assets worth 73% of liabilities, and that 70% of the average debtor's
assets are secured. They also found that 61% of the liabilities of the average debtor are owed
to secured creditors. See Warren & Westbrook, supra note 7, at 1222. These numbers imply
that secured creditors on average recover 91% on their claims and unsecured creditors
recover 45%. The second figure likely overstates recoveries for tort claimants in particular
because the Bankruptcy Code gives priority to general unsecured claims over claims for
exemplary and punitive damages. ii U.S.C. S 726(a)(2)-(4). Also, it should be noted that
Chapter 7 liquidations, which are both smaller and more numerous than Chapter ii
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increasing their recoveries to 100%. But the prospect of so dramatic an increase
in tort recoveries makes* superpriority a political nonstarter at a time when
most tort reform proposals seek to tamp down on tort litigation167 The
proposal's radicalism becomes further apparent when one realizes that tort
creditors would have to be given superpriority over other creditors even when a
debtor lacked secured debt, for otherwise a debtor would increase expected tort
recoveries by borrowing on a secured basis, and secured lending would be
excessively discouraged. From an efficiency perspective, superpriority would
slow bankruptcy proceedings by holding a debtor's entire estate in limbo while
pending tort litigation was resolved. It also would further discourage contract
creditors generally, and secured creditors especially, from monitoring to
prevent asset depletion, because it would shift the fruits of such efforts to tort
claimants. Whether these costs would outweigh the benefit of increased tort
deterrence is unclear at best, which is another reason the proposal seems
unlikely to be adopted.
A second bid to aid tort claimants - and unsecured creditors generally - was
made by Elizabeth Warren, whose "set-aside" proposal would invalidate
secured claims to the extent that they collectively covered more than 8o% of the
value of a debtor's assets at the time of default. 6 8 When less than 8o% of a
debtor's assets were secured, the proposal would have no effect. The primary
efficiency benefit would be to scale back the most egregious instances of
oversecurity, such as when a debtor gives a blanket lien to a creditor with a
small claim. 16 , In this way, the proposal would reduce opportunism costs. But
most oversecurity would be unaffected: a creditor who contributed 1% of a
debtor's debt capital could still enforce a lien covering 8o% of assets. And the
proposal is overinclusive as well, because it measures oversecurity when the
debtor defaults rather than when the secured claim is granted. For this reason,
a deep devaluation of unsecured assets could produce a set-aside of secured
reorganizations, feature debtors who are more deeply insolvent. See Warren & Westbrook,
supra note 7, at 1210. Liquidations therefore will yield a wider disparity between secured and
unsecured recoveries.
167. See Steven L. Harris & Charles W. Mooney, Jr., Measuring the Social Costs and Benefits and
Identifying the Victims of Subordinating Security Interests in Bankruptcy, 82 CORNELL L. Rsv.
1349, 1371-72 (1997) (noting political impediments to proposals to subordinate secured
claims).
168. Elizabeth Warren, An Article 9 Set-Aside for Unsecured Creditors, 51 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. PUP.
323, 325 (1997).
169. As written, Warren's set-aside would have no effect on secured creditor deficiency claims,
and therefore would enable secured creditors to reclaim some of the set-aside assets to the
detriment of unsecured creditors.
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assets even if the secured creditors had taken security in nothing more than the
property purchased with their loan proceeds. The proposal therefore would
raise secured creditors' appraisal costs and further undermine their incentive to
monitor to protect the secured collateral. Finally, the set-aside would slow
down the distribution of assets whenever the secured claims could be verified
more quickly.
A third reform proposal is the "partial priority" plan offered by Lucian
Bebchuk and Jesse Fried, under which bankruptcy courts would treat at least
25% of every secured claim as unsecured -and thus payable pro rata with the
claims of unsecured creditors -regardless of the value of the secured assets. 7 °
Once again, the objective would be to reduce opportunism costs by increasing
recoveries for unsecured creditors. Partial priority would be more effective in
this regard than Warren's set-aside, because it would increase unsecured
recoveries whenever the secured assets were worth more than 75% of the
secured claim. But opportunism would still occur because secured creditors
would still be ensured a higher percentage recovery than unsecured creditors in
a bankruptcy proceeding. 17' And partial priority would undercut the efficiencies
that the priority right generates-a drawback that Bebchuk and Fried
acknowledge.' 72 By making 25% of a secured claim unsecured, partial priority
would shift an asymmetrical arrangement one quarter of the way back to the
pro rata rule, thereby increasing appraisal costs for all creditors, slowing the
distribution of secured assets in bankruptcy, and providing no clear
monitoring benefits.
Symmetry avoids the tradeoff inherent in each of these proposals. Like
other proposals, symmetry would reduce opportunism costs by increasing
170. More specifically, this is the "fixed-fraction" version of partial priority. Bebchuk & Fried,
supra note 2, at 9o9. The authors also suggest an "adjustable priority" rule that seeks to aid
nonadjusting creditors specifically rather than unsecured creditors generally. Id. at 905.
m. Under partial priority, secured creditors would continue to have an incentive to oversecure
their loans, because they would benefit from preventing the secured assets from
depreciating to less than 75% of the amounts of their claims. But partial priority would not
increase the incentive to oversecure as symmetry would, which is perhaps the proposal's
primary virtue. Given, however, the proposal's relative disadvantages in terms of
monitoring, appraisal, and bankruptcy efficiencies, its attractiveness as a vehicle for
reducing the social costs of oversecurity is doubtful. To the extent that oversecurity is a
concern worth addressing, the better approach would be symmetry combined with rules
that police oversecurity directly. Cf supra text accompanying note 145 (discussing the use of
fraudulent conveyance law to scale back oversecured claims).
172. Bebchuk and Fried observe that partial priority would raise appraisal costs for secured
creditors and potentially reduce incentives for creditors to monitor to prevent asset
depletion. Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 2, at 914-17.
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recoveries for nonadjusting creditors. But symmetry would accomplish this
result while preserving the priority right, thereby enhancing rather than
undermining secured lending's current economic benefits in terms of appraisal
efficiencies and bankruptcy speed. And only symmetry corrects how the law of
secured lending now discourages efficient monitoring. In other words,
symmetry is the only proposal with no evident economic downside. In
addition, the fact that symmetry leaves intact the secured creditor's priority
right makes it more attractive politically, as the priority right is at the core of
the traditional conception of secured lending. The status of the deficiency
claim, in contrast, is not even addressed in Article 9, and therefore by changing
it Congress is less likely to be seen as trampling on the province of state or
common law. For this reason, symmetry is the least radical proposal, and not
only because it is the only one that, by reinforcing the benefits of secured
lending, ensures a net increase in social wealth.
CONCLUSION
This Article has introduced a framework for comparing the efficiency of
legal arrangements that enable a debtor to subordinate creditor claims to
specific assets without the creditors' consent. Despite their variety, all modern
arrangements that partition debtor assets in this way can be characterized as
either symmetrical or asymmetrical. This distinction is powerful because, as
this Article has shown, symmetrical partitioning is more efficient in terms of
each of the major economic benefits of asset partitioning that scholars have
identified. Asymmetrical partitioning, by contrast, is better only for
transferring wealth away from nonadjusting creditors, a result that generates
various social costs.
The categorical superiority of symmetrical partitioning makes the
asymmetry of several widely used arrangements under current law difficult to
justify. In particular, this Article has shown that the asymmetry of the secured
loan is a source of multiple inefficiencies, and that the arrangement would be
more socially beneficial if the secured creditor's deficiency claim to the
unsecured assets were subordinated to the claims of unsecured creditors.
Similar economic benefits likely would result from parallel reform of the
American general partnership, which also is asymmetrical under current law.
In particular, subordination of the claims of partnership creditors to partners'
personal assets would discourage parties from using the partnership to transfer
wealth away from the partners' personal creditors, and would pay social
dividends through lower debt appraisal costs, better creditor monitoring, and
faster liquidation proceedings. A third arrangement worth reexamining is the
guaranty contract, which currently enables parties to contract around
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symmetry to the detriment of creditors whose consent to the arrangement is
not required.
Although this Article has focused on the economic consequences of rules
that govern the relative priority of creditor claims, the logic of its framework
makes clear that the allocation of value among debtor asset pools implicates
similar social costs and benefits. In particular, an "imbalanced" partitioning
arrangement may resemble an asymmetrical one in terms of its economic
impact. Yet current restrictions on the shifting of value among debtor asset
pools are patchy, and lack a clear relationship to economic efficiency. This is
evidenced not only by the absence of rules against oversecurity, but also by
similar laxity that extends to other partitioning arrangements. For example,
while the Bankruptcy Code prohibits an insolvent partnership from
distributing value to a partner,173 no rule restricts asset shifting in the reverse
direction, despite the hazard of opportunism toward partners' nonadjusting
personal creditors. In light of the recent financial crisis, a perhaps timelier
example is a set of Bankruptcy Code provisions that exempts derivative
contract counterparties from the Code's automatic stay and from its general
prohibitions on constructive fraudulent conveyances and preferences. 174 These
exemptions enable counterparties to force insolvent debtors to make margin
payments and post additional collateral, and to seize and liquidate that
collateral when the debtor is bankrupt. As a consequence, exempted creditors
are able to expand and enforce with impunity what is in essence a secured
claim, to the direct detriment of unsecured creditors. Such examples suggest
that lawmakers need to reconsider how asset shifting is best policed, and to ask
in particular how changes in that regard could reinforce the benefits of reform
aimed to improve the efficiency of creditor priority rules. In this way, the
distinction between symmetry and asymmetry provides a framework for
understanding the economic consequences of the broader set of legal doctrines
that define creditors' rights, and for asking in each case whether rules that
enable debtors to engage in nonconsensual subordination of creditor claims are
likely to create or destroy social wealth.
173. 11 U.S.C. § 5 4 8(b) (2000).
174. Id. §§ 3 62(b)(6)-(7), (17), 546(e).
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